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INTRODUCTION

In its thirtieth year, the Federal Circuit continued to face an
increased caseload, including a fourth-consecutive increase in patent
infringement appeals from district courts. During 2012, the court
issued several notable en bane opinions providing parties and
practitioners with additional clarity on a range of disputed issues. For
example, in Zoltek Corp. v. United States^ {Zoltek TV), the court reversed

its prior panel decision in Zoltek III,^ which limited the scope of 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a) to direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a).
The court reexamined the premises on which Zoltek III was based and
effectively reinstated the government's potential liability for
infringement of method claims directed to manufacturing carbon
fiber sheets for the F-22 fighter, where part of the steps began in
Japan. In Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Hemcon, Inc.,^ the court

held that an amendment to the claim during reexamination, not
mere argument, wzis necessary to invoke intervening rights. In the
much-anticipated decision in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc.,'* the court overruled its decision in BMC Resources Inc. v.

Paymentech, L.P.,^ in which the court held that for a party to be liable
for induced infringement, some other single entity must be liable for
direct infringement. Deliberately avoiding resolving whether direct
infringement can be found when no single entity performs all of the
1. 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane).
2. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
3. 672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane).
4. 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane) (per curiam), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct.
1521 (2013); 133 S. Ct. 1520 (2013).
5. 498 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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claimed steps of the patent, the Akamai court instead focused on the
issue of induced infringement squarely before it to hold that liability
for induced infringement did not require a single entity to directly
infringe.
The court's year was also notable for those cases in which en bane
review was denied. After the panel in Highmark, Inc. v. Alicate Health
Management Systems, Inc.^ held that the objective prong of the
exceptional case analysis under § 285 was subject to de novo review
(relying on Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. G&re & Associates^

which held that that objective recklessness in a willfulness
determination under § 284 is subject to de novo review), a narrow
majority of the court denied a rehearing en bane. Additionally, in In
re Baxter International, Inc.^ a split panel upheld the Patent and
Trademark Office's (PTO) determination of obviousness in the
reexamination of a patent previously upheld as valid by the Federal
Circuit. Although the court overwhelmingly denied the petition for
rehearing en bane, a trio ofjudges clarified that their agreement with
the majority was "premised on [the] understanding that the panel
opinion does not . . . endorse administrative nullification of a final
judicial decision."^
In 2012, the Supreme Court continued to shape key facets of patent
law, namely with respect to the foundational issue of patent eligible
subject matter. For example, in Majo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus

Laboratories, Inc.,^^ the Supreme Court held that a patent directed to a
medical diagnostic test was im'alid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court issued an order simultaneously
granting certiorari in Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,

Inc.,^^ vacating the judgment, and remanding the case back to the
Federal Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision in
Mayo. At the Federal Circuit, a new panel reached the same
conclusion as the original panel with Judge Bryson dissenting,'^ and
the Public Patent Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union
6. 687F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 701 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012),
petition for cert,filed,81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 12-1163).
7. 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012), ceH. denied sub nom. W.L. Core & Assocs. V.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013).
8. 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir.), reh'genbanc denied, 698 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
9. 698 F.3d at 1349 (O'Malley,J., concurring from denial of rehearing en bane)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
10. 132S. Ct. 1794 (2012).
11. 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), granting cert, sub nom. to Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
V. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
12. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent 8c Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Foundation again filed a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari for a second time,'^ and oral arguments were held
on April 15, 2013.'*
The past year also saw the court remain active in its efforts to
rationalize and improve the efficiency of patent litigation. After
Chief Judge Rader unveiled the Federal Circuit Advisory Committee's
Model Order Regarding E-Discovery in Patent Cases at the end of
2011,'^ the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
considered the court's model order and quickly implemented a new
model order for use in patent cases in that district.'^ The
International Trade Commission (ITC) also considered the court's
model order and proposed amendments to the ITC's rules of
procedure that would limit e-discovery and address privilege claims in
Commission investigations.'' In its opinions, the Federal Circuit also
addressed procedural issues hotly contested by parties in the district
courts, including joinder, transfer, and sanctions. For example, the
court limited precluded joinder under Rule 20 in suits filed prior to
the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act'® (AIA).'^
Panel decisions of the court also reversed a district court's decision
denying Rule 11 sanctions against a plaintiff,^" and reiterated de novo
review of exceptional case status under 35 U.S.C. § 285.^'
The year 2012 also saw continued changes in the court's
composition. Judge Gajarsa retired on June 30, 2012, after serving
fifteen years on the court, during which time he brought the court
valuable insight based on his technical background and experience as
a patent examiner. For fifteen years, the court benefited from Judge
Gajarsa's perspective that was informed by his technical background
and experience as a patent examiner. Judge Gajarsa's retired shortly
after he authored the en bane court's opinion in Zoltek IV (he was a
member of the majority in the Zoltek 777 panel decision). In 2012,
Judge Linn took senior status. In more than a decade of active service
13. 133S.Gt. 694(2012).
14. No. 12-398 (U.S. argued Apr. 15, 2013).
15. E-DlSCOVERY GOMM., FED. GiRCUn' ADVISORY GOMM., AN E-DlSCOVERY MODEL
ORDER (2011 ), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/announcements
/Ediscovery_Model_Order.pdf.
16. E.D. Tex. R. app. P, at/a¿Za¿/e a/http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_
document.cgi?document=22218&download=true.
17. Rules of General Application, Adjudication, and Enforcement, 77 Fed. Reg.
60,952 (Oct. 5, 2012).
18. Pub L. 112-29,125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.G.).
19. /nr«EMGGorp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1358-59 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
20. Raylon v. Gomplus Data Innovations Inc., 700 F.3d 1361 (2012).
21. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc., 687 F.3d 1300
(Fed. Gir. 2012).
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on the court, Judge Linn authored several notable opinions including
NTP V. Research in Motion, Ltd.^^ in 2005, which addressed the
extraterritorial reach of method claims, and Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsofl
CorpP in 2011, which rejected the much-maligned "25% rule" for
determining a reasonable royalty, the predominant measure of
damages for patent infringement.^'* Just after the new year in 2013,
Judge Bryson also took senior status. Judge Bryson has served on the
bench as an active judge since 1994, which service included
authoring the court's en bane decision in the landmark case Phillips
V. AWH Corp}^ in 2005, which clarified the hierarchy of evidentiary
authority for claim construction and provided a roadmap for every
lower court claim construction proceeding that followed. On
February 7, 2013, President Obama nominated PTO Solicitor
Raymond Chen and Todd Hughes of the Department of Justice to fill
the two new vacancies. Nominated in 2011 to fill the vacancy left by
Chief Judge Michel's retirement, Richard Taranto was confirmed on
March 11, 2013. If the President's pending nominees are confirmed,
then fully half of the court's twelve active members will have less than
five years on the bench. Chief Judge Rader will continue to preside
over this changing of the guard on his court.
Looking forward, the Federal Circuit is set to consider en bane
more heretofore unresolved issues, including the patent eligibility of
computer-related claims^^ and the court's jurisdiction over judgments
on infringement liability before issues of damages and willfulness
have been decided by the trial court.^^ The court will also likely
increasingly receive requests to clarify provisions in the AIA, which
was enacted in September 2011. In addition to including immediate
changes to the law of joinder and preventing further abuse of the qui
tam provision of the false marking statute, this major congressional
revision contained many provisions that are only recently coming into
effect. For example, the AIA's post-grant review provisions became
active in September 2012, and the world patent community awaits the
full implementation of the AIA's first-to-file provisions, which took
effect in March 2013. The Federal Circuit has already addressed one
direct challenge to the AIA, holding that the retroactive elimination
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
2013)
27.
2013)

418 F.3d 1282 {Fed. Cir. 2005).
632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
/d. at 1315.
415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane).
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., No. 11-1301 (Fed. Cir. argued Feb. 8,
(en bane).
Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg., Nos. 11-1363 (Fed. Cir. argued Feb. 8,
(en bane).
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of the false marking statute's qui tam provision does not violate the
constitutional right to due process.^® The patent bar also anticipates
decisions in three patent-related cases presendy at the Supreme
Court, including Bowman v. Monsanto Go.,^ FTG v. Actavis, Inc.^" and
Myriad Genetics.^^ With a backdrop of a drastically revised statutory
scheme and impending guidance on existing law from the Supreme
Court, the Federal Circuit will be called upon early and often in the
coming years to shape and retain the delicate balance of private
incentives and public benefits embodied within the U.S. patent
system.
I.

PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY

A.

Inventorship

The Federal Circuit addressed an appeal from an interference
proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 135 (a) in Loughlin v. Ling.^^ Ling's
Patent Application No. 11/671,404 (the '404 application) copied
claim 1 of Loughhn's U.S. Patent No. 7,434,426.^^ Loughlin had filed
Application No. 10/845,624 (the '624 application) on May 13, 2004,
which was published on November 18, 2004.^^* Ling's '404
appUcation was filed on February 5, 2007, but claimed priority under
35 U.S.C. § 120 to an application filed on January 16, 2004.^^
When the PTO declared an interference, Loughlin asserted that
Ling was time barred under 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (2) because the '404
application was filed more than a year after the publication of the
'624 application.^® The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(Board) concluded that the priority claim under 35 U.S.C. § 120
gave the '404 application the benefit of the earUer effective priority
date and that the bar of 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) does not apply."
The court, agreed, and noted that the Board has consistently
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 135(b)(2) in this manner.^« Although Ling
attempted to argue that the Federal Circuit does not have
28. Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., 702 F.3d 624, 632 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
29. No. 10-1068 (U.S. argued Feb. 19, 2013) (patent exhaustion).
30. No. 12-416 (U.S. argued Mar. 25, 2013) (covering antitrust implications of
reverse payment settlements).
31. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398 (U.S.
argued Apr. 15, 2013) (involving patent eligibility of isolated human genes).
32. 684 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
33. /¿.at 1290-91.
34. Id. at 1290.
35. /d.;iee35 U.S.C. §120(2006).
36. Loughlin, 684 F.3d at 1291; see 35 U.S.C. § 135(b) (2).
37. Loughlin, 684 F.3d at 1291.
38. /¿.at 1294.
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jurisdiction because Loughlin requested an adverse judgment under
37 C.F.R. § 4L127(b), the court noted "that the Board's decision on
priority is a final, adverse judgment over which [the court has]
jurisdiction."^^
In another interference appeal, Hollmer v. Harari,^^ the Federal
Circuit addressed a question of continuity in the chain of priority for
a patent application.'*' At issue was a chain of applications filed by
Harari:
U.S. Patent Application No. 09/310.880 (the '880
application), which was a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No.
08/771,708 (the '708 application), which was a continuation of U.S.
Patent Application No. 08/174,768 (the '768 application), which was
a continuation of U.S. Patent Application No. 07/963,838 (the '838
application), which was a divisional of an original U.S. Application
No. 07/337,566 (the '566 application) .-^^ The '566 application
contained an incorporation by reference to another application, U.S.
Patent Application No. 07/337,579 (the '579 application) by naming
the inventors, tide, and stating that the '579 application was filed on
the same day.**^
In a previous case, the court determined that the amendment of
the specification for the '880 application to change an incorporation
by reference to the '579 application by preliminary amendment upon
initial filing was held to a "reasonable examiner" standard.'*'*
However, when reviewing an incorporation by reference in an issued
patent, a "reasonable person of ordinary skill in the art standard"
should be applied.''^ The intervening '838 and '768 applications did
not have any amendment to their specifications to refer specifically to
the '579 application, so the court had to determine whether these
applications had an incorporation by reference that was sufficiendy
specific.'"' The court noted that, in the case of the '566 application,
there were at least three other applications co-pending by the same
inventors with the same title as the one intended to be incorporated
by reference and that "[s]uch ambiguity in incorporation does not
suffice.'"*^ As such, applying the "reasonable person of ordinary skill
in the art" standard, the court held that the intervening '838 and '768
39. /rf. at 1292.
40. 681 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 989 (2013).
41. /í¿. at 1353.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1354 (citing Harari v. Hollmer, 602 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
45. Id. at 1357 (quoting Zenon Envt'l, Inc. v. U.S. Filter Corp., 506 F.3d 1370,
1379(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
46. /rf. at 1356-57.
47. /á. at 1358.
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applications did not have the proper incorporation and that "the '880
application is not entitled to the benefit of the priority date of the
'566 application.""«
B.

Anticipation

In a patent infringement case, Krippelz v. Ford Motor Co.,*^ the
Federal Circuit found reversible error in the district court's denial of
Ford's motion for judgment as a matter of law due to invalidity by
anticipation.^" While defending the validity of patent for a vehiclemounted lamp, Krippelz submitted a declaration (from the same
expert called to testify at trial), which stated that "a beam of light. . .
typically has the light bulb at or near the focal point of a reflector."^'
The expert specifically described a shape of the refiector and
positioning of the light source relative to the refiector, which would
read on the "conical beam of light" limitation of the claim.^^ The
Federal Circuit noted that this statement, which was used during the
appeal to the Board to overcome prior art cited by the examiner,
constituted a disclaimer of lamps that do not have the shape and
position as described.^^ Although not appealed by Ford, the court
noted that Krippelz's expert's measurements based on the drawings
of the prior art reference may be improper because the drawings
were not drawn precisely to scale or linked to quantitative assessments
in the specification.^* Notwithstanding these measurements, the
court determined that the expert's "generic statements that the
'conical' limitation was unmet were . . . too conclusory to sustain the
jury's verdict."**
Furthermore, in response to arguments by Krippelz that "a conical
beam of light 'probably wouldn't be a very effective way to
accomplish the purpose of [the prior art], and . . . [the prior art]
actually teaches away from using a beam,'" the court reiterated that
"teaching away is not relevant to an anticipation analysis."*® As to
another limitation of the claim, the court referred to the drawings of
the prior art reference and resolved that it was clear that "a person of
ordinary skill" who reviewed the diagrams would comprehend that
48. Id.
49. 667 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
50. « . a t 1265.
51. Id. at 1267 (emphasis omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. M a t 1268.
55. Id. at 1269.
56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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the diagrams illustrated the claimed subject matter, and stated that
"the conclusory testimony of an expert witness, however, cannot
create an issue of fact if none otherwise exists. "^^
The Federal Circuit in In re Rambus, Inc.^^ addressed a claim
construction issue, i.e., how a claim term of a patent should be
construed without contradicting the patent's own specification and
prosecution history, the same or similar term in related patents of the
same family, and even the patent's litigation history.^^
In In re Rambus, the two parties disputed the meaning of the claim
term "memory device" relative to a prior art reference.^ As the
patentee, Rambus attempted to construe the term relatively narrowly
to avoid the reference by making the following arguments: (1) the
stated goals of the invention in the specification of the patent could
be achieved only through the interpretation of the term proposed by
Rambus; (2) the expert testimony of Hynix, the party accused of
infringing the patent in a separate litigation, supports Rambus's
narrow interpretation of the term; and (3) Rambus's narrow
interpretation of the term was used to distinguish the prior art in the
patent's prosecution history.*^' But the Federal Circuit rejected each
of the three arguments.^^
As to the first argument, the Federal Circuit concluded that
"[t]here are no words of manifest exclusion or clear disavowals of
multichip devices [in the specification]—there are only preferred
embodiments and goals of the invention that Rambus argues are
better met by single chip devices."^^ In other words, the meaning of a
claim term is generally open-ended, and it is not recommended to
read a negative limitation into the claim term unless there is a clear
disclaimer of such limitation in the specification or prosecution
history of the patent.^
Second, the Federal Circuit gave little weight to the expert
testimony in the district court's litigation, which appears to support
Rambus's proposed construction because "the expert testimony is
conflicting and unpersuasive."^^

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. (citing Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
694 F.3d 42 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/d. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-48.
Id.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
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Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected the third argument because
the patent's prosecution history does not support that Rambus used
this argument to overcome the prior art.^^ Moreover, the Federal
Circuit discussed how the claim term is used in several other patents
belonging to the same family as the patent at issue.®' Both parties
agree that "unless otherwise compelled . . . the same claim term in
the same patent or related patents carries the same construed
meaning."^ The court found that, for more than one occasion,
Rambus's interpretation invites an invalid result under the claim
differentiation principle, whereas the Board's version does not have
this problem.^^
The central issue in Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.J" was

whether a product developed by Leader Technologies ("Leader") was
in public use and/or on sale more than one year before the critical
date of the patent-in-suit, thus rendering its claims invalid under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b)." Leader sued Facebook, alleging infringement of
claims of its patent for software that allows users on a network to
communicate and collaborate on a large scale.'^ A jury found that
the asserted claims of the patent-in-suit were "invalid on two
independent grounds: (1) that the invention was subject to an
invahdating sale; and (2) that the invention was subject to an
invalidating public use.'"* On appeal. Leader argued that Facebook
failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the version of
the software on sale or used prior to the critical date fell within the
scope of the patent-in-suit's asserted claims.'* In addition. Leader
contended that even if the jury did not believe the inventor's
testimony that the software was not on sale or used prior to the
critical date, such discredited testimony does not constitute
affirmative evidence of its opposite—that is, that the software was on
sale or used prior to the critical date.'^
The Federal Circuit rejected Leader's arguments and affirmed the
district court's ruling.™ First, the Federal Circuit pointed to Leader's
66.
67.
68.
(Fed.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 48.
Id. (quoting Omega EngV, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334
Cir. 2003)).
<=
00
Id.
678 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 889 (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Uader Techs., 678 F.3d at 1302.
Leader Techs., 678 F.3d at 1301, 1304.
Id. at 1304.
Id. at 1306.
Id.
M at 1308.
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own interrogatory responses, which admitted that the software
"embodies" the asserted claims of the patent-in-suit.^' Although
Leader contended that the responses referred only to the version of
the software available at the time when the responses were served, the
court concluded that the lack of any reference to "date ranges" or
"versions or builds of the software" supported a broader reading that
includes the versions of the software prior to the critical date.^^
Finally, the court concluded that, although "'normally' a witness's
'discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing
a contrary conclusion/"^^ in this case, the inventor's lack of credibility
reinforced other evidence suggesting the contrary conclusion and
also provided an independent reason to disbelieve his statement that
he "vividly remember [ed]" that the patented technology was not
incorporated into the software "until days before" the filing of the
provisional patent application.^*^
In In re Antor Media Gorp.,^^ Antor Media Corporation ("Antor")
appealed a decision of the Board affirming rejection on
reexamination of claims in U.S. Patent 5,734,961.^^ The question
before the court was whether "prior art publications cited by an
examiner [during prosecution] are presumptively enabling."^'' The
Federal Circuit had previously held in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc.,^ that "the examiner is entided to reject application
claims as anticipated by a prior art patent without conducting an
inquiry into whether or not that patent is enabled or whether or not
it is the claimed material (as opposed to the unclaimed disclosures)
in that patent that are at issue."^^
Antor argued on appeal that the presumption of validity (and
therefore enablement) is accorded to issued patents under 35 U.S.C.
§ 282, and thus non-patent publications should not be accorded the
same presumption of enablement.^'' The Federal Circuit disagreed,
noting that the Amgen court did not rely on 35 U.S.C. § 282.®^
Instead, the Federal Circuit pointed out, the Amgen court held that
77. /rf. at 1306.
78. /¿.at 1307.
79. Id. at 1307 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S.
485,512(1984)).
80. Id. at 1304, 1307 {alteration in original).
81. 689 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
82. M a t 1285.
83. M at 1287.
84. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
85. M at 1355.
86. Antor Media, 689 F.Sd at 1288.
87. Id.

2013]

2012 PATENT L A W DECISIONS

839

placing the burden on the applicant is procedurally convenient
because the applicant is in the best position to demonstrate why a
disclosure is not enabling.** In justifying its extension of that
reasoning to this case, the Federzil Circuit stated, "[i]ndeed, as
indicated with regard to unclaimed patent prior art, an examiner,
who has no access to experts or laboratories, is not in a position to
test each piece of prior art for enabiement in citing it, and requiring
him to do so would be onerous, if not impossible."*^
In In re Montgoviery,^" the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's 35
U.S.C. § 102 (b) rejection of claims based on inherent disclosure of
the prior art.^' On April 29, 2005, Montgomery filed U.S. Patent
Application No. 11/118,824 (the '824 application) claiming a
"method for the treatment or prevention of stroke or its recurrence"
comprising administration of renin-angiotensin system ("RAS")
inhibitors to patients diagnosed as in need thereof.®^ The examiner
rejected the claims of Montgomery's application as anticipated based
on prior art that describes the administration of a known RAS
inhibitor, ramipril, to subjects at risk of stroke.®^
Despite
Montgomery's argument that the prior art merely proposed future
research and was not enabled, the Board affirmed the examiner's
rejections after finding that the prior art's study was clearly enabled
to administer ramipril as treatment for patients, including those with
previous stroke.®* Montgomery filed requests for rehearing, but the
Board rejected Montgomery's request for the same reasons.^^
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the elements at issue were the
administration of the RAS inhibitor "(1) to a patient diagnosed as in
need of [stroke] treatment or prevention, (2) where such
administration is for the treatment or prevention of stroke or its
recurrence."®^ The Federal Circuit concluded that the prior art
disclosed both of these requirements for the following reasons.^'
The court first determined that the prior art disclosed the first of
the contested elements—the administration of the RAS inhibitor to
"a patient diagnosed as in need of [stroke] treatment or

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
M at 1289.
677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir.), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 788 (2012).
7d. at 1381-82.
M at 1376-77.
/¿.at 1377.
/d. at 1378.
7d. at 1379.
Id. at 1380 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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prevention."^^ The court noted that Montgomery did not contest
that the patients in the prior art satisfy this requirement.^^ The court
further pointed out that the prior art "explicidy disclosed the
administradon of ramipril to patients *at high risk for cardiovascular
events such as myocardial infarction and stroke/ and the eligibility
criteria included patients with previous stroke."'°^
The court determined that the prior art inherendy disclosed the
second element at issue—that such administration is for the
treatment or prevention of stroke or its recurrence—because it
disclosed a protocol for the administration of the RAS inhibitor to
stroke-prone patients, and administradon of the inhibitor to the
stroke-prone patients inevitably treats or prevents stroke.^*"
Judge Lourie dissented, however, finding no inherent anticipation
by the prior art's disclosure regarding the study because the results
the proposed protocol may have achieved were neither predictable
nor inevitable.'^^ In Judge Lourie's view, inherency requires
"description of action that inevitably produces a result, not merely
descripdon of acdon that might have been carried out, but was not,
and might have yielded a particular result, but did not."'°^ Judge
Lourie concluded that the prior art at issue failed to andcipate the
claims because it only described a plan that has not been carried out,
and because it is impossible to know whether or not the plan would
accomplish the claimed result if it was carried out.'"**
The majority agreed with the dissent that a result is only inherent if
it "inevitably" flows from the prior art disclosure, but concluded that
there was no question that treating stroke-prone padents with
ramipril does in fact inevitably treat or prevent stroke."'^
In Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc.,^^^ the Federal

Circuit addressed the quesdon of when an árdele on the Internet
qualifies as publicly available prior art.'"^ Years ago, the court held
that a dissertation indexed in a university library catalog was a

98. Id. (alteration in orieinal).
99. Id
^
100. Id.
101. /d. at 1380-81.
102. Id. at 1385 (Lourie, I., dissenting).
103. Id.
^
^^
104. Id.
105. /d. at 1381 (majority opinion).
106. 698 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert,fikd,81 U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S.
Apr. 4, 2013) (No. 12-1227).
107. /d. at 1379.
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publicly available printed publication,'"^ but a thesis that was neither
shelved nor catalogued was not publicly accessible.'"®
Here, Voter Verified asserted a patent for automated voting
systems, with a critical date of December 7, 1999."° An article by
Tom Benson provided all of the limitations of claim 49,"' and was
originally available online by subscription in 1986."^ Subsequently,
the Benson article was available to everyone (without a subscription)
in January 1995.'"
Voter Verified argued that the Benson article was not sufficiently
available to qualify as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (b) because "a
web-based reference like the Benson article must be 'searchable by
pertinent terms over the internet' to qualify as a prior art 'printed
publication.'""* The Federal Circuit did not agree with the proposed
indexing requirement."^
The proper inquiry is whether the
reference was "sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the
art" prior to the critical date."® Public accessibility is determined on
a case-by-case basis, and here the evidence showed that there was
adequate accessibility: the Risks Digest website (where the Benson
article was posted) was well-known to those concerned vnth electronic
voting technologies, and by September 1995, the website included a
search tool "that would have retrieved the Benson article in response
to search terms such as 'vote,' 'voting,' 'ballot,' and/or 'election.'"'"
Because the website was well-known to those interested in the subject
matter, was publicly accessible, and had a search tool, it was not
required to be indexed by a commercial Internet search engine."*

108. See, e.g.. In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899-900 (Fed. Gir. 1986).
109. See, e.g.. In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357,1362 (G.G.P.A. 1978).
110. Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1380.
111. M at 1381 ("While the disclosures in the Benson article are not identical with
the language of clîiim 49, we agree with the district court that the Benson article
would have made the voting method of claim 49 obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art of computerized voting technology.").
112. Id. at 1380; see Tom Benson, Computerized Voting, RISKS DiG. (Mar. 4, 1986,
4:27 PM), http://cadess.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/2.22.html#subj3.1.
113. Voter Verified, 698 F.3d at 1380.
114. M at 1379.
115. /d. at 1380.
116. Id. (quoting In reGronyn, 890 F.2d 1158,1160 (Fed. Gir. 1989)).
117. /d. at 1380-81.
118. Id.
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C. ' Obviousness
1.

Indicia of Non-obviousness
At issue in Wm. Wrigleyjr. Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA LLO^^ was the

relative importance of the fourth factor (the so-called "secondary
considerations") as well as the legitimacy of a "burden-shifting
framework."'^^ In Cadbury, Wrigley argued that Cadbury's patent for
chewing gum infringed upon its patent (the '223 patent) disclosing a
synergistic relationship between two cooling agents in chewing gum:
menthol and an agent referred to by the trade name WS-23.'^>
Cadbury filed a counterclaim, asserting that Wrigley's chewing gum
infringed upon its patent (the '893 patent).'^^ The district court
granted Wrigley's motion for summary judgment and, inter alia,
found the '223 patent to be obvious in view of prior art references
teaching the use of WS-23 and menthol as possible cooling
ingredients in chewing gum.'^^ On appeal, Wrigley argued that the
combination of WS-23 and menthol led to an unexpected cooling
sensation—resulting in great commercial success.'^'' These facts,
Wrigley argued, all supported a factual conclusion of non-obviousness
based on secondary considerations.'^^
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's summary
judgment, stating that Wrigley did not demonstrate that the effect of
combining WS-23 and menthol produced a significantly unexpected
result that was different from the already known effect of combining
WS-23 and menthol.'^^ The court, however, stopped short of
endorsing a burden-shifting framework, whereupon ¿le burden of
proving a claim's validity is shifted to the patent-owner after the
accused-infringer has demonstrated a prima facie case for
obviousness.'^^
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of obviousness, and, in
particular, hindsight reconstruction and objective indicia of nonobviousness in Mintz v. Dietz äf Watson, Inc.^^^ Marcus and Neil Mintz
119. 683F.3cil356(Fed. Cir. 2012).
120. /d. at 1364-65.
121. /d. at 1358.
122. /d. at 1359.
123. /d. at 1359-60.
124. See id. at 1362-63 (noting that Wrigley's evidence that the combination of
WS-23 and menthol led to commercial success focused on a Cadbury study that
"concluded that the flavor and cooling features of Wrigley's products were superior
to those of the Cadbury products with which they were compared").
125. /d. at 1563.
126. /d. at 1363-65.
127. /d. atl365n.5.
128. 679 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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were co-inventors of a patent directed to knitted casing structure for
meat products.'^' Package Concepts & Materials (PCM), previously a
distributor of Mintz's products, began to sell products that direcdy
compete with Mintz.'^° In 2005, PCM filed a declaratory judgment
action against Mintz.'^' Mintz, in turn, filed an infringement
action.'^^ After consohdation of the separate suits, the California
district court conducted a Markman hearing and issued a claim
construction order.'^* The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on validity and infringement.'^* The district court granted
PCM's motion, finding Mintz's patent obvious.'^^
On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's ruhng that Mintz's patent claims were obvious.'^^ The Federal
Circuit found the district court's ruling faulty on several fronts. First,
the district court erred by relying on a "common sense approach"
and finding that it would have been obvious to try an element of the
claimed invention.'" The district court did not include in the record
any showing that ordinarily skilled artisan would possess this
knowledge, and the "mere recitation of the words 'common sense'
without any support adds nothing to the obviousness equation.'"^®
Additionally, the Federal Circuit admonished the district court for
essentially engaging in hindsight reconstruction when finding the
claims obvious.'*^ In the Federal Circuit's view, the manner in which
district court stated the problem to be solved represented a form of
prohibited hindsight reliance.'''" The district court emphasized that
the problem in the prior art was merely forming a checkerboard or
gridlike pattern in the knitting.''" The Federal Circuit noted that
"[o]ften the inventive contribution lies in defining the problem in a
new revelatory way."'''^ The court continued, "[i]n other words, when
someone is presented with the identical problem and told to make
the patented invendon, it often becomes virtually certain that the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

/d. at 1374.
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
M at 1380.
M at 1377.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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artisan will succeed in making the invention.""*^
To prove
obviousness, PCM would need to show that an ordinarily skilled meat
encasement artisan would have created the meat encasement
structure in the patent to solve the adherence problem.''"
Further, the Federal Circuit noted the district court's failure to
consider or make findings as to Mintz's evidence showing objective
indicia of non-obviousness.'**^ In the Federal Circuit's view, "[t]hese
objective criteria help inoculate the obviousness analysis against
hindsight" bias.'**^ Based on the several errors in the district court's
obviousness analysis, the court vacated and remanded the case to
district court to determine whether further proceedings are
necessary.'**^
In Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith ûf Nephew, Inc.,^^^ the Federal

Circuit decided the issue of obviousness in a case in which the
defendant pushed for special interrogatories, wherein the jury
answers special factual questions and issues a general verdict.'"*^
Kinetic Concepts Inc. and Wake Forest University Health Sciences
("Wake Forest") brought suit against Smith & Nephew, alleging
infringement of two patents.'^° Wake Forest owns the asserted
patents, and Kinetic Concepts are the exclusive licensees of the
patents.'"*' Both patents protect methods and apparatuses that apply
suction and negative pressure to treat difficult-to-heal wounds.'^^
In the district court, the jury returned a jury verdict form
determining that (1) the prior art exhibited differences from the
claims, (2) there were numerous objective considerations of nonobviousness, and (3) obviousness was not established.'^^ Smith 8c
Nephew moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the
juiy's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.'^"* The
district court judge agreed, finding that the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art were minimal and that the
objective indicia of non-obviousness did not overcome the case of
obviousness.'^^
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
/¿.at 1377-78.
/d. at 1378.
Id.
W. at 1380.
688 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/d. at 1353,1359.
M a t 1346.
Id.
Id.
/d. at 1354.
M at 1355.
M at 1356.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the decision, holding that there were
indeed differences between the prior art and the claims, and that
Smith &: Nephew offered no evidence establishing the reasons to
combine the references to arrive at the claimed invention.'^®
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that "there is more than
substantial evidence [in the record] supporting the jury's findings of
commercial success, long-felt need, copying, unexpected and
superior results, wide spread acceptance in the field, and initial
skepticism."'^' As with its decision in Mintz v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., the
Federal Circuit warned about the dangers of ignoring objective
indicia of non-obviousness, noting that "[t]he objective indicia of
non-obviousness serve a particularly important role in a case, like this
one, where there is a battle of scientific experts regarding the
obviousness of the invention. In such a case, the objective indicia
provide an unbiased indication regarding the credibility of that
evidence.'"^® The overwhelming existence of secondary indicia of
obviousness played a very important role in upholding the validity of
the patented claims.'^^
2.

Willful Infringement

The Federal Circuit addressed two issues in K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix
CoTp}^ Vita-Mix, a manufacturer of high-end blenders, appealed the
district court's conclusion that Vita-Mix infringed the asserted claims
of K-TEC's two patents designed to reduce the problem of
cavitation.'®' First, the court reaffirmed the applicability of the
analogous art test to the obviousness-type invalidity analysis.'^^
Second, the court discussed the elements a patentee must prove to
prevail on an allegation of willful infringement.'^^
The analogous art test is used for determining the applicability of a
reference to the obviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103.'^
For a reference to be proper for use in an obviousness rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the reference must be analogous art to the
claimed invention, "i.e., it must satisfy one of the following
conditions: (1) the reference must be from the same field of
156. 7á. at 1366-67.
157. /d. at 1368.
158. /á. at 1370-71.
159. Id.
160. 696 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
161. Id. at 1368 (explaining that cavitation arises when "a pocket of air envelops
the area surrounding the blender blade").
162. « . a t 1375.
163. /d. at 1378.
164. Id. at 1375.
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endeavor; or (2) the reference must be reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.'"^^
In K-TEC, the court rejected Vita-Mix*s arguments that two patents
that depict five-sided containers should be qualified as analogous
art.'^ First, the court reasoned that the specification of the patent-insuit identified four problems "that the invention solves: blender
speed, safety, cavitation, and the blender's ability to blend frozen
ingredients."'^' To be treated as analogous art, the two references
should be reasonably pertinent to at least one of the four problems.'^
But the problem that Vita-Mix identified in the inventor's testimony,
creating a smaller jar to fit within K-TEC's existing quiet box, was not
one of the four problems because the K-TEC's existing jars already fit
inside the quiet box.'^^ Second, Vita-Mix's expert report on invalidity
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because it did not
explain why the inventor would have referenced non-blending
containers to uncover the commonplace designs depicted in the two
references.'^° Third, the court held that the Board's decision in an
inter partes examination that the two references were analogous art
did not raise an issue of material fact because the opinion was not
issued until after the district court's final judgment.'^' Therefore, the
district court did not have the benefit of the Board's analysis.'^^
To avoid willful infringement, "the patentee must prove (1) that
the accused infringer 'acted despite an objectively high likelihood
that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent'; and (2)
that this objectively defined risk was either known or so obvious that
the accused infringer should have known about it.'"^^ In the instant
case, the court concluded that K-TEC met these requirements. First,
summary judgment properly disposed Vita-Mix's non-infringement
theory and most of its invalidity theories.'^'' Second, rather than
adopting one of many non-infringing designs, Vita-Mix opted for a
design that performed so similar to K-TEC's product such that its
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See id. ("A reference is reasonably pertinent if it, as a result of its subject
matter, 'logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in
considering his problem.'" (quoting Innovention Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm't, Inc.,
637F.3d 1314, 1321 {Fed. Cir. 2011))).
169. /d. at 1375.
170. Id.
171. /d. at 1375-76.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1378 (quoting In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (en bane)).
174. Id.
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customers would not be able to distinguish it from K-TEC's
product.'™ Third, K-TEC introduced substantial evidence that VitaMix proceeded with its design despite having knowledge of the
objectively high risk of infringing K-TEC's
3.

Presumption of Validity

The Federal Circuit weighed in on the presumption of validity in
Sdele Pharma Inc. v. Lupin Ltd.^^^ Lupin filed an Abbreviated New

Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval to market a generic
version of the extended-release tablet, Fortamet.'™ Shionogi Pharma
(formerly Sciele Pharma), a marketer of Fortamet, sued Lupin for
patent infringement, asserting a patent listed in the Orange Book
entry for Fortamet.'™ Despite a lack of final judgment on the merits
of the case. Lupin attempted to launch its generic form of
Fortamet.'^^ In an attempt to stop Lupin from selling the generic
tablet, Shionogi moved for a preliminary injunction, which the
district court granted.'*'
The pat:ent at issue was granted under unusual circumstances.
Although Lupin canceled certain rejected claims, it received a notice
of allowance for its pending claims, which mistakenly included those
that had been canceled.'*^ Lupin informed the PTO of this mistake,
and the PTO responded by removing the canceled claims, issuing an
amended notice of allowance, and permitting amended claims.'^^
Oddly, the issued patent did not consist of the claims found in the
supplemental notice of allowance, but instead contained the
canceled claims from the first notice.'**
The most significant issue in this case was the presumption of
validity.'*^ Lupin argued that the erroneous issuance of the cancelled
claims should prevent the presumption of validity from attaching in
this instance.'*® Shiongi argued that this case warranted a heightened
presumption of validity because Lupin relied upon two prior art
references that were before the Patent Office during the prosecution
175.

Id. (noting that Vitamix initially made nearly a direct copy of K-TEC'sfivesided jar).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
684 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
M at 1256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d. at 1256-57.
Id. at 1257.
Id.
«.at 1259-61.
M at 1259.
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of this case.^^^ Judge Moore pointed out that both parties were
wrong.'^ The burden of proof was clear and convincing evidence of
invalidity regardless of whether the Patent Office previously
considered a prior art reference.'^^ Although the PTO previously
considered the prior art references, the burden does not shift to
something higher, such as "extremely clear and convincing evidence
or crystal clear and convincing evidence."'^^ While the burden is not
heightened, a court or jury may assign more weight to evidence that
was not previously before the Patent Office.'^'
Despite the issuance of several claims, the court ruled that the
presumption of validity should apply.'^^ The prosecution history
should, however, still be considered—including the peculiar
circumstances regarding issuance of the claims and the fact that the
two references were before the PTO.'^^
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district court's
obviousness analysis was flawed."*'* The court rejected the district
court's finding that Lupin's statements concerning obviousness only
apply to the enablement requirement.'^'' Instead, the court held that
the statements also act as proof that modifying the tablet in this
manner would be part of routine experimentation by a person of skill
in the art.'^^ The preliminary injunction was vacated and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.'^^
4. Affirmed Rejection ofGlaims

In In re Suong-Hyu Hyon,^^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims, focusing particularly on the
Board's finding ofthe motivation to combine the prior references.'^
The application at issue is Reissue Application No. 10/643,674 (the
"reissue application"), which originated as U.S. Patent No.
6,168,626.^™ The claims ofthe reissue application involve Ultra High
Molecular Weight Polyethylene (UHMWPE), particularly with regard
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

/rf. at 1259-60.
M a t 1260.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
M a t 1261.
Id.
Id.
M at 1262-63.
Id.
/rf. at 1263.
679 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/rf. at 1367.
/rf. at 1364.
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to the use of UHMWPE in artificial joints.^"' Specifically, the claims
at issue recite methods comprising (1) crosslinking UHMWPE by
irradiating a UHMWPE block having a molecular weight of not less
than five million with a high energy radiation, (2) heating the
crosslinked block to a compression deformable temperature below
the melting point of the UHMWPE, (3) subjecting the block to
pressure, and (iv) cooling the block.^"^
The examiner rejected the claims of the reissue application as
being obvious over U.S. Patent No. 5,030,402 (Zachariades) in view of
U.S. Patent No. 3,886,056 (Kitamaru).^''^ Specifically, the examiner
found that Zachariades teaches each limitation of the claims except
for the step of crosslinking the UHMWPE prior to compression and
rehed on Kitamaru instead for teaching of crosslinking the UHMWPE
prior to compression.^"^ The examiner further concluded that a
person of ordinary skill would obviously rely on Kitamaru's
crosslinked UHMWPE in Zachariades' method because Kitamaru
demonstrates that "crosslinking prior to compression deformation
results in improved transparency, an increased melting point, and
excellent dimensional stability. "^"^
The applicant, Hyon, challenged the examiner's rejection based on
the argument that there was no motivation to combine the
references.^"^ The Board, however, rejected Hyon's arguments that a
motivation to combine was lacking because both references are
directed to the same material, UHMWPE.^"' Moreover, the Board
found that Kitamaru offers the reason for combining the teachings of
the prior references "to provide UHMWPE articles with improved
dimensional stability and transparency at high temperatures."^"* The
applicant did not challenge the determination as to what the
references taught.^"^
Hyon appealed the Board's decision. During the appeal, Hyon
noted that while Zachariades deals with artificial joints, Kitamaru
addresses films or sheets. Hyon stressed the importance of this
distinction, as a person of ordinary skill would have no motivation to
combine references dealing with "fundamentally different material
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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technologies."^'^
The court, however, disagreed with Hyon's
argument because both references pertain to UHMWPE.^" The
court found that the Board's rejections were also based on the
Board's finding, supported by substantial evidence, that despite
Zachariades' preference for crosslinking after molding, Zachariades
did not state that this method was the only way to make UHMWPE
products.^'^
Hyons also argued that the Board "improperly relied on the
arbitrary selection of a single feature from Kitamaru (precompression crosslinking) while ignoring the other features."^'^ The
court, however, found that the . Board's selection of the
precompression crosslinking step was motivated by Kitamaru's
teaching that taking this step would lead to the improved properties.
The Board's motivation demonstrated that it "did not take the
teachings of Kitamaru in isolation or out of context."^''' The court
therefore concluded that the Board properly found the motivation to
combine the Zachariades and Kitamaru references and affirmed the
Board's determination that the reissue claims would have been
obvious in light of the combination of the prior art references.^'^
Judge Newman dissented, however, and stated that "[w]hen the
technologic field is mature, apparendy small changes that produce
unexpected results or improved properties are of heightened
significance."^'^ In this case. Judge Newman determined that
"[n]othing in the record suggests that a person of ordinary skill
would have foreseen that Hyon's method of slight radiation
crosslinking followed by heating and compression deformation would
produce the described benefits," and that the Board indeed failed to
justify any expectation that, under the Hyon method, combining the
prior art references would create a superior polyethylene artificial
In In re Mouttet,^^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's 35
U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims, focusing particularly on the Board's

210. /d. at 1366.
211. Id.
212. Id. ("Zachariades does not state that UHMWPE products can be made only by
crosslinking after compression deformation, nor does it state or suggest that faulty or
inferior products will result from crosslinking prior to compression.").
213. M a t 1366-67.
214. M a t 1367.
215. Id.
216. /(¿.at 1371 (Newman,J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218. 686F.3dl322(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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finding that that combination of the prior references was predictable
and that there was no teaching away in the prior art.^'^
On April 3, 2006, sole inventor Mouttet filed U.S. Patent
Application No. 11/395,232 (the '232 application) claiming a
computing device comprising a crossbar array consisting of "two
intersecting sets of conductive parallel wires" wherein a "thin film
material or molecular component acts as a bridge between the wires"
at the wire junctions or crosspoints.^^"
The PTO examiner rejected all of the inventor's pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as unpatentable over Ealk reference. Das
reference, and Terepin reference, disclosing a digital signal
processor.^^' Specifically, the examiner found that the Ealk reference
taught all of the limitations of the claim except for "(1) a crossbar
array implemented with electrical wires rather than optical light
paths, (2) crosspoints with programmable states based on electrical
conductivity rather than optical intensity, and (3) conversion of
analog signal outputs to digital output bit patterns in the postprocessing unit."^^^ The examiner instead relied on Das "to teach the
missing crossbar array using wires and crosspoints that are
programmable to have electrical conductive states, and on Terepin to
teach a component converting analog signals to digital bit
patterns."^^* In light of Das and Terepin, the examiner found
Mouttet's claims over Falk to be obvious, and thus rejected the
claims.^^"* Mouttet challenged the examiner's rejection, but the
Board affirmed the examiner's rejection.^^^
On appeal, Mouttet contested the Board's finding regarding the
impact using electronic wires would have on Ealk's operation as a
programmable arithmetic uriit.^^'' The court, however, found that the
Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence because Falk's
programming and processing of junction states have nothing unique
to its optical implementation, and Mouttet presented nothing to
demonstrate otherwise.^^'
The court further noted that "a
determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple
219. Id. at 1334.
220. Id. at 1325.
221. «.at 1326-27.
222. « a t 1329.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. « a t 1329-30.
226. Id. at 1331-32 (describing Mouttet's disagreement with the Board over
whether Falk suggested that the use of electronic wires, rather than optical paths,
"would destroy Falk's ability to operate as a programmable arithmetic unit").
227. « a t 1332.
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references does not require an actual, physical substitution of
elements."^^^
Moreover, Mouttet argued that Falk teaches away from the claimed
invention based on the following passage disclosing a "fundamental
difference" between circuit types and the inferiority of electrical
circuits compared to the optical circuitry for certain purpose:
There is a fundamental difference between optical circuits, in
which the information carriers are photons, and electronic circuits,
where the carriers are electrons . . . . [I]n optical devices, there
exist interconnect possibilities that do not exist with electronic
hardware, in particular, interconnected parallel architectures
which permit digital arithmetic and logic operations to be
performed in a completely parallel, single step process. After the
inputs are switched on, the output appears in the time it takes a
photon to transit the device. No faster computation time is
The court, however, again found the Board's decision was supported
by substantial evidence because the above passage did not "teach
away from a non-preferred embodiment containing an
arithmetic/logic system having electrical circuitry with wire sets."^^^
The court further noted that Mouttet failed to cite any additional
reference to show that the claimed invention would not be reached
using electrical circuitry.^^' The court therefore affirmed the Board's
determination that the claims at issue would have been obvious in
light of the combination of the prior art references.^^^
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection
of claims in In reDroge^^^ focusing particularly on the Board's finding
of a reasonable expectation of success when combining prior art
references.^^'' The claims at issue were directed to methods of
"sequence specific recombination of DNA in a eukaryotic cell" using
modified bacteriophase integrase, Int-h and Int-h/218.^^^ The
examiner rejected the claims as obvious over the combination of the
Crouzet reference (U.S. Patent No. 6,143,530), which provides "a
method of creating therapeutic DNA molecules using sequencespecific recombination in either a host cell or in vitro" and the

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id. at 1333.
/rf. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
695 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/rf. at 1338-39.
Id. at 1336.
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inventors' own reference, the Christ reference, and the Board
aiFirmed the examiner's rejection.^^^
During the prosecution, the applicant submitted a declaration
from one of the inventors. Dr. Droge, ("Droge Declaration"),
explaining why there was no reasonable expectation that someone
with ordinary skill in the art would have had success using the
modified bacteriophase integrase to induce recombination in
eukaryotic cells based on the three-dimensional structure of DNA in
the cells.^^' In making the decision, however, the Board determined
that an article by Brenda J. Lange-Gustafson and Howard Nash
refuted the assertions in the Droge Declaration and affirmed the
examiner's rejection because "the wild-type integrase works in
eukaryotic cells, the ordinary artisan would have had a reasonable
expectation of success that [Int-h and Int-h/218] would also function
at some level in eukaryotic cells."^'*
The applicant appealed the Board's obviousness rejection and
argued that differences in the cell types and protein co-factors meant
that someone skilled in the art would not expect Christ's modified
integrase proteins to facilitate recombination in prokaryotic cells to
work in eukaryotic cells as well.^^^
On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit found substantial evidence
in support of the Board's conclusion that someone with ordinary skill
in the art could reasonably expect to be successful in combining the
prior references.^"*" In particular, the court noted that Crouzet
"discloses that wild-type bacteriophage integrase Int can induce sitespecific DNA recombination using the attB and attP recognition
sites," and that Christ "supplies a motivation to use [a modified
bacteriophase integraase] in the method taught in Crouzet. . . [for]
increased affinity for core binding sites in the att regions."^*^ With
respect to the Lange-Gustafson article, the court agrees with the
Board that this article discloses that Int-h "'sponsors reduced but
significant levels' of recombination in the absence of IHF and that,
'in the absence of IHF, Int-h recombines supercoiled and
nonsupercoiled [DNA] identically.'"^*^ Thus, the court concluded,
"[t]he article directly contradicts the assertion in the Droge
Declaration that a skilled artisan would not expect the modified
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
/¿.at 1337.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
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integrases Int-h and Int-h/218 to work in eukaryotic cells based on
the three-dimensional structure of DNA in those cells."^**^
The court therefore unanimously affirmed the Board's
determination that the claims at issue would have been obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, in light of the combination of the prior art
references.^''^
On September 28, 2012 in Poz£n Inc. v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.,^^^

the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that claims of
U.S. Patent No. 6,060,499 (the '499 patent), U.S. Patent No.
6,586,458 (the '458 patent), and U.S. Patent No. 7,332,183 (the '183
patent) were not invalid for obviousness.^'*^
The claims in the '499 and '458 patents were directed to
composition or methods of use comprising concomitant
administration of sumatriptan and naproxen.^"*^ The district court
found that the '499 and '458 patents were not invalidated by the
prior art references because the combination of the cited references
did not "teach or suggest the simultaneous administration of
sumatriptan and naproxen" and did not "disclose to one of ordinary
skill in the art that the combination of sumatriptan and naproxen
produces a longer lasting efficacy reducing migraine relapse
compared to the administration of naproxen or sumatriptan
On appeal, the applicant argued that the district court erred
because the one prior art reference, Catarci, showed concomitant
administration used in migraine treatment.^''^ Specifically, the
patient was prescribed "a daily NSAID as a prophylactic with
sumatriptan used as needed."^''^ The Catarci reference, tided
"Ergotamine-Induced Headache Can Be Sustained By Sumatriptan
Daily Intake," described "a single patient who developed ergotamineinduced headaches and subsequendy replaced ergotamine with daily
administration of sumatriptan."^^'
The Federal Circuit held that there was no clear error in the
district court's finding that Catarci does not invalidate the claims in
the '499 and '458 patents.^^^ Catarci simply concludes that
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.

M at 1338-39.
696F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
M a t 1165-66.
M a t 1157-58.
M. at 1160.
M. at 1164.
Id.
Id.

M at 1164-65.
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sumatriptan and acupuncture were the only effectual treatment for
the patient concerned, but does not conclude that a combination of
naproxen and sumatriptan and naproxen provided migraine relief.^^^
The Federal Circuit also agreed with the district court's finding that
Catarci actually discouraged combining the drugs to achieve the
efficacy benefits claimed in the '499 and '458 patents.^^* The court
therefore held that the appellants failed to meet their burden to
rebut the presumed validity of issued patents with clear and
convincing evidence, and that the claims of the '499 and '458 patents
thus are not invalid for obviousness.^^*
The claims of the '183 patent were directed to multilayer
pharmaceutical tablets comprised of naproxen and triptan, wherein
said naproxen and said triptan independently dissolve.^^® On appeal,
the appellant argued that the district court applied an incorrect
construction of "independent dissolution" in its invalidity analysis,
using a narrow definition of the term when the "plain and ordinary"
meaning, which appellant contended the court used in finding
infringement, would have rendered the claim obvious.^" The
Federal Circuit, however, noted that the appellant neither explained
the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the term nor identified how
such meaning differs from the purported "narrow" meaning.^*^
Rather, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court's
infringement analysis construed "independent dissolution" as defined
within the patent, no differendy from how the district court
construed the term during its invalidity analysis.^*^ The Federal
Circuit therefore affirmed the district court's holding that the claims
ofthe '183 patent were not
^^
5.

Disclosure Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)

In Fox Group, Inc. v. Cree, Inc.,^^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's finding of
invalidity of two claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (g).^^^ The patentee
Fox Group asserted a patent that claims a silicon carbide material

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id.
at 1165.
Id.
at 1158.
Id.
at 1165.
Id.
at 1166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
700 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
at1301.
Id.
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with specific properties.^^^ The parties did not dispute that defendant
Cree, prior to the critical date, had grown a silicon carbide material
that met all of the limitations of the asserted claims.^^
Fox argued that Cree had not "conceived" of the invention because
it could not demonstrate that it had a repeatable process to create
the claimed silicon carbide material.^^^ The Federal Circuit identified
at least two flaws with this argument.^^^ First, because Cree had
"reduced the invention to practice" before the critical date of the Fox
patent, it was not required to prove "conception."^^^ Second, having
reduced the invention to practice, it was not required to do so
repeatedly.^^
The Federal Circuit also pointed out that the prior inventor does
not need to "establish that he recognized the invention in the same
terms as those recited" in the contested patent claims.^^^ There was
no dispute that the silicon carbide material that Cree made in 1995
met all of the requirements of the Fox patent claims.^^°
Fox also argued that Cree suppressed or concealed^^' the invention
because "Cree (1) did not file a patent application for [the silicon
carbide material it created], (2) did not present proof of
commercialization that would allow for reverse engineering, and (3)
did not otherwise provide adequate disclosure because it failed to
reveal the details of the growth conditions under which [the
material] was made."^^^
The Federal
Circuit explained
that patenting and
commercialization are two ways of making an invention available to
the public, but neither is required under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).2"
Moreover, Fox's arguments that Cree did not provide an enabling
disclosure were all based on cases involving process claims.^^'* When a
patent claims a process, a prior inventor seeking to invalidate it under
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) must prove prior invention of this process, and
263. /d. at 1302.
264. /d. at 1305.
265. /¿/.at 1304.
266. M a t 1304-05.
267. Id.
268. /rf. at 1305.
269. Id. (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334. 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
270. Id.
271. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2006) ("A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless . . . before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this
country by another inventor who has not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.").
272. /bxGí^.,700F.3datl306.
273. Id. (discussing printed publications as a third method).
274. M at 1307.
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that this prior invention was not "abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed. "^'^ Here, the asserted claims recited "a silicon carbide
material" and Cree did not suppress or conceal its possession of a
silicon carbide material that met all of the claim limitations.^™
Sometimes secondary indicia of non-obviousness can overcome a
prima facie showing of obviousness. In Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Dulling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.P"^ the Federal Circuit

considered such secondary indicia.^™ In an earlier appeal of a
summary judgment ruling in the same case, the Federal Circuit held
that two prior art references taught all of the limitations of the
asserted claims and that one of the references provided a motivation
to combine them.^™ However, the court had also stated that the
secondary indicia could form a strong basis for rebutting the prima
facie case if the factual disputes were resolved in Transocean's
The asserted patent claimed an improved apparatus for offshore
ddlling.^^' Conventional drilling rigs use a single-column derrick that
is only capable of raising or lowering one component at a time.^®^
Transocean's "dual-activity" drilling apparatus, disclosed in the
patents concerned, sought to increase the efficiency this process.^*^
Holding that "evidence of secondary considerations may often be
the most probative and cogent evidence in the record,"^®* the court
upheld the jury findings that all of the secondary indicia presented
favored Transocean.^^^
Transocean demonstrated commercial
success of the claimed invention and a nexus between the claimed
invention and the success;^^® industry praise for the claimed invention
and unexpected results;^^' copying of the claimed invention by
others, including an internal Maersk document indicating a desire to
275. Id.
276. /d. at 1302,1307.
277. 699F.3dl340(Fed. Cir. 2012).
278. M a t 1349.
279. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Drilling USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296,1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
280. Id. at 1305; see also Gregory A. Castanias & Douglas R. Cole, 2010 Patent Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit: The Advent of "the Rader Court, " 60 AM. U . L. REV. 845,
934-35 (2011) (observing that the court resolved all inferences in favor of the patent
holder).
281. Transocean, 699 F.3d at 1345.
282. Id. at 1346.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1349 (quoting Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
285. /d. at 1355.
286. /d. at 1350.
287. /d. at 1351.
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incorporate the efficient dual-activity functionality of the claimed
invention;^^ industry skepticism, showing concern that in dual-activity
rigs there would be clashing or colliding of two drill strings;^^^
licensing fees, demonstrating that customers and competitors were
paying a premium for the claimed dual-activity rig;^^** and long-felt yet
unresolved need for rigs that operated efficiendy in deep water,
going back to the 1970s.^^'
Based on the secondary indicia, and the substantial evidence
supporting those indicia, the court concluded that Maersk had failed
to prove the claims were obvious by clear and convincing evidence.^^^
Consequendy, the court reversed the judgment as a matter of law of
obviousness.^^
6. Obviousness Afler KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.
In GW. Zumbiel Go. v. Kappos,^^'' C.W. Zumbiel Co., Inc. ("Zumbiel")
challenged the Board's determinations in reexamination regarding
obviousness and non-obviousness.^^^ Zumbiel requested inter partes
reexamination of Graphic Packaging International's (Graphic)
patents using several pieces of art.^^ The patents at issue covered
long, rectangular cartons that have a tear-off end.^^ This type of
carton is commonly used to sell soft drinks and other beverages.^^^
The reexamination and Board proceedings found certain, though
slighdy different, claims to be either obvious or patentable.^^ The
parties appealed the Board's decision seeking to. respectively,
overturn the patentability or obviousness holdings.^'' The Federal
Circuit affirmed the Board's findings.^'
The court first addressed Graphic's cross appeal seeking a finding
of patentability over the art.^°^ The court walked through each of
Graphic's arguments, affirniing the Board in each.^^' The court then
288. /d. at 1352.
289. /d. at 1352-53.
290. M a t 1353.
291. /¿.at 1354.
292. W. all355.
293. Id.
294. 702 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
295. M a t 1373.
296. /rf. at 1378.
297. /d. at 1374-75.
298. Id.
299. M a t 1378-79.
300. M. at 1379.
301. M. at 1386.
302. M at 1379-82.
303. Id. Graphic made three separate arguments in its appeal. First, Graphic
asserted that based on previous patents, it was not obvious to provide a finger flap on
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addressed Zumbiel's arguments seeking a determination of
obviousness.^"'' The court assessed each of Zumbiel's arguments,
affirming the Board in each.^°^ Judge Prost dissented in part and
argued that KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.^^ compelled a finding
of obvious for one of the claims.^"' Judge Prost stated that the
Board's decision, which the court reaffirmed, was contrary to the
teaching of KSR International because the Board focused too much on
the teaching of the art and too litde on practical and common sense
factors that are necessary components of an obviousness inquiry.^"*
In Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sandoz Inc.,^"^ the Federal Circuit

revisited and clarified the "lead compound"^^" analytical framework
for evaluating the obviousness of chemical compounds.^" This
approach, most notably associated with Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.
V. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd.^^^ emerges from Otsuka Parmaceutical alive and

well.*'* Judge Lourie, writing for the Federal Circuit, reiterated the
two-step inquiry formulated in his earlier Takeda opinion.*''' First, the
court must assess "whether a chemist of ordinary skill would have
selected the asserted prior art compounds as lead compounds, or
the top panel of carton. Id. at 1379-80. The court afFirmed the BPAI's decisionstating a placing a opening on the top of the carton is a "predictable variation." Id.
Second, Graphic maintained that based on previous patents it was not obvious to use
the fold line of the carton to create a dispenser. Id. at 1380. The court disagreed
and held was obvious "to one of skill in the art in light of the prior art references."
Id. Finally, Graphic argued that the "free-ends" and "single tear line" were both
patentable. The court held, however, agreed with BPAI's legal assessment that both
the "free-ends" and "single tear-line" were prior art. Id. at 1380-82.
304. Id. at 1382.
305. Id. at 1382-85. Zumbiel had two arguments relating to obviousness. First,
Zumbiel asserted that because of prior art, the location of the fmger-flap between the
first and second cans was obvious. Id. at 1382-83. The court disagreed and held that
substantial evidence affirms the BPAI's conclusion that moving the tear line on
patented containers was not obvious. Id. at 1385. Second, Zumbiel claimed that the
BPAI erred in applying the language of the preamble of various claims because the
word "containers, while in the preamble, is not in the body of the claim. Id. The
court held, however, that because the preamble is a limitation only when the claim
depends on it, or when it is necessary to comprehend the terms or limitations of the
claim in the body, Zumbiel's claim fails because the terms in the preamble are
merely limitations. Id.
306. 550 U.S. 398(2007).
307. C.W. Zumbiel, 702 F.3d at 1387 (Prost,J., dissenting-in-part).
308. /d. at 1387-88.
309. 678 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 940 (2013).
310. Id. at 1291 (adopting the defmition of "lead compound" from Takeda in
which it is described as a "compound in the prior art that would be most promising
to modify in order to improve its . . . activity and obtain a compound with better
activity" (quoting Takeda Chemical Indus, Ltd. v. Alphapahrm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d
1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ) ).
311. See ¿d. at 1291-93.
312. 492 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
313. See Otsuka Pharm. 678 F.3d at 1292.
314. to id. at 1291-92.
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starting points, for further development efforts."^'^ Second, the court
must determine "whether the prior art would have supplied one of
ordinary skill in the art with a reason or motivation to modify a lead
compound to make the claimed compound with a reasonable
expectation of success."^'^
In this case, defendants Sandoz and a group of ANDA applicants
attempted to invalidate an anti-schizophrenic drug, aripiprazole,
marketed by Otsuka as Abilify.^" To this end, Sandoz argued that the
claims in Otsuka's patent were obvious in view of three prior art
carbostyril derivative compounds.^'^ The district court concluded
that the defendants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
"that the asserted claims would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill" in the art.^'^ In reaching this conclusion, the district court
assessed the known carbostyril derivatives, with particular emphasis
on the three "lead compounds" asserted by the defendants.^^^ After
evaluating the prior art and the claimed invention, the district court
found that the asserted claims were not obvious because the prior art
did not teach an ordinarily skilled chemist to choose one of the three
"lead compounds" as a lead compound.^^*
The Federal Circuit agreed, rejecting Sandoz's contention that the
district court's lead compound analysis "f [ell] into a rigid obviousness
analysis precluded by KSR"^^^ In the Federal Circuit's view, the
district court did not err when it found that a person "of ordinary
skill in the art" would not have used the prior art compounds as lead
compounds for further research or made the modifications necessary
to arrive at the claimed compound.^^^ Thus, the Takeda two-step lead
compound analysis remains the approach when evaluating the
obviousness of chemical compounds.
7.

Other Issues with Obviousness

In Pregis Corp. v. Kappos,^'^^ Free-Flow Packaging International., Inc.
("Free-Flow"), a joint defendant with Kappos, appealed the denial of
its motions for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict of non315. /(¿.at 1291.
316. /d. at 1292.
317. /d. at 1284,1286.
318. Id. at 1286-90 (referencing unsubstituted butoxy, 2,3-dichIoro propoxy,
andOPC>4392).
319. /d. at 1286.
320. Id.
321. /d. at 1289.
322. Id. at 1290-91 (internal quotation marks omitted).
323. /d. at 1296.
324. 700 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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infringement and invalidity.^^^ Both Pregis and Free-Elow "are
competitors in the air-filled packing cushion industry."^^^ Pregis had
attempted to block the issuance of two Eree-Elow patents and took
the "unusual step" of suing both Eree-Elow and the PTO under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) .^^^ The district court dismissed
the APA claims, holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.^^*
Pregis cross-appealed the dismissal and sought judicial review of the
PTO's decision to issue certain Eree-Elow patents.^^^ The court
affirmed the district court's rulings.^^"
The court first addressed Eree-Elow's appeal for a judgment as a
matter of law based on the claimed non-obviousness of the claims.^^^
In determining obviousness, a court must analyze four factors as set
forth in Graham v. John Deere Co.^^^: (1) the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the claimed
invention; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the invention's field; and
(4) any objective factors such as commercial success, an anticipated
but unsolved need, and copying by others.^^^ Eree-Elow did not
dispute that the combinations of the prior art taught its claimed
elements.^^* Instead, Eree-Elow asserted that there was no evidence of
a reason why anyone would combine the prior art in the necessary
manner to create the claimed elements.^^^ Eree-Elow asserted that
"the prior art taught away" from its patented combinations.^^® The
court reviewed the trial record and found that there was sufficient
evidence to support the obviousness determination.^^^
The court next considered Pregis's APA argument «is to "whether a
competitor, who has been sued as an infringer, is entitled under the
APA to judicial review of the PTO's decision to grant the patents in
suit."**® Relying on the reasoning of its prior rulings considering the
APA, the court held that a third party may not challenge the PTO's
decision to issue a patent by suing the PTO under the
325. « a t 1350.
326. Id.
327. « a t 1352.
328. « a t 1352-53.
329. Id. at 1350.
330. Id.
331. « a t 1354.
332. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
333. « a t 17-18.
334. Pregis, 700 F.3d at 1354.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. « a t 1354-56.
338. Id. at 1356.
339. Id. at 1356-61. The court cited to 35 U.S.G. § 131 as specifically precluding
third parties from challenging PTO decisions to issue patents. Id. at 1357.
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The Federal Circuit again addressed the issue of obviousness in Eli
Lilly &' Co. V. Teua Parenteral Medicines, Inc.^^ Three patents related t
pemetrexed, an and<ancer drug, were assigned to the Trustees of
Princeton University and licensed exclusively to Eli Lilly.^"" Teva,
Barr Laboratories and APP Pharmaceuticals ("Teva") filed ANDAs
seeking approval to market generic variants of Alimta, Lilly's brand
name for pemetrexed, before Lilly's patent expired.^'*^ Lilly
responded by alleging infringement of several claims in its licensed
patent.^'*^ Teva conceded infringement but argued that the asserted
claims "were invalid for obviousness-type double patenting" over
claims from the two other patents licensed to Lilly that had previously
expired.^'''' The district court concluded that the relevant claims of
the patent at issue were not invalid for obviousness-type double
patenting, and Teva appealed.^"*^
In another opinion by Judge Lourie, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision on appeal, at one point quoting Otsuka
that an obviousness-type double patenting analysis "requires
identifying some reason that would have led a chemist to modify the
earlier compound to make the later compound with a reasonable
expectation of success."^^ Teva contended that the case required the
court to look only at the differences between the claims at issue and
the earlier claims "so that any features held in common between the
claims . . . would be excluded from consideration."^**^ The Federal
Circuit acknowledged that this was ari incorrect reading of the case
law (specifically, Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.).^^ In the
Federal Circuit's view, the differences between the claims must not be
considered in isolation but rather as a whole.^**^
Teva also argued that disclosure in an earlier patent of a claimed
intermediate in the synthesis of pemetrexed reriders the later
composition of matter claims invalid for obviousness-type double
patenting, as the latter claims essentially appropriate an already
disclosed compound and method of use.^^° The Federal Circuit
340. 689F.3dl368(Fed. Cir. 2012).
341. /d. at 1373, 1375.
342. Id.
343. M a t 1375.
344. Id.
345. /¿.at 1375-76.
346. Id. at 1378, 1381 (quoting Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz Inc., 678 F.3d 1280,
1297(Fed. Cir. 2012)).
347. Id. at 1377.
348. Id. (quoting Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
349. Id.
350. /d. at 1378.

2013]

2012 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

863

disagreed with this argument, noting that the intermediate claimed
in the earlier patent and pemetrexed are structurally different, and
that it is not necessary to use the claimed intermediate to produce
pemetrexed.'^' In sum, the Federal Circuit held that the district
court correcdy concluded that the asserted claims are not invalid for
obviousness-type double patenting over the earlier issued patents.'^^
D. Indefiniteness
In HTG Gorp. v. IPGom GmbH & Go., KG,^^^ the Federal Circuit

found that the district court erred in holding that IPCom's asserted
claims were indefinite because they claimed both an apparatus and
method steps.'^* IPCom's claims cover a "handover" in a cellular
telephone network, which occurs when a cellular telephone ("mobile
station") switches from tower ("base station") to another base
station.^^^ The claims describe elements performed to achieve a
handover."'^ According to the Federal Circuit, this error resulted
from an erroneous claim construction wherein the district court
found that the mobile station performed the enumerated
functions.'^'
The Federal Circuit opined that the district court did not
adequately examine the claims themselves, which demonstrated that
the six previously-recited elements provided functional structure for a
separately claimed network—in other words, they were not method
steps.'*® According to the court, the district court also failed to look
to the specification, which would have confirmed that the network,
not the mobile station, performs the six enumerated functions.'*^
While the court acknowledged that the applicant mentioned the
"claimed process" during the prosecution history, it found that the
district court placed too much emphasis on this because the claim
language and the specification did not indicate the applicants were
claiming a process.'^" Due to its nature as an ongoing negotiation

351. Id. at 1380.
352. Id.
353. 667 F.3dl270(Fed. Cir. 2012).
354. Id. at 1277.
355. Id. at 1273 (illustrating as an example when a traveler in a car drives between
coverage areas).
356. Id. at 1274.
357. Id. at 1274-75.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1275-76.
360. Id. at 1276.
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with the U.S. Patent Office, prosecution history lacks the clarity of the
specification, and should have been given lesser weight.^^'
While HTC failed to preserve the argument, the Federal Circuit
confirmed that means-plus-flinction structure disclosed in a
specification must be "more than simply a general purpose computer
or microprocessor"—it must also disclose an algorithm for the
microprocessor.^^^ Here, the Federal Circuit did not review this issue,
because as a general rule, an appellate court does not consider an
issue not passed upon
E.

Reissue Proceedings

Broadening reissue practice allows a patentee to seek broadening
of the scope of protection of an issued patent. Effectively, this
practice gives the patentee a chance to have a "second bite at the
apple," subject to certain restrictions, one of which is a two-year time
limit imposed by 35 U.S.C. § 251 (d), i.e., a broadening reissue
application must be filed at the PTO within two years after the
issuance of the original patent.^^ The patentee can also file a
continuing broadening reissue application outside the two-year time
limit as long as the continuation application is filed while its parent
application is still pending.^^^ But a question arises here as to
whether or not the continuation application is still the "second bite at
the apple" under 35 U.S.C. § 251, to which the Federal Circuit gave a
positive answer in In re Staats.^^^
In In re Staats^ the continuing reissue application was filed almost
seven years after the original patent issued and well outside the twoyear limit.^^' The Board rejected the continuing reissue application
on the ground that the continuing reissue application could not
"broaden patented claims beyond the statutory two-year period in a
manner unrelated to the broadening aspect that was identified within
the two-year period."^^ By reversing the Board's decision, the
Federal Circuit held that "after a broadening reissue application has
been filed within the two year statutory period, an applicant is 'not
barred from making further broadening changes' after the two year
361. Id.
362. Id. at 1280 (quoting Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521
F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
363. /¿.at 1281-83.
364. 35 U.S.C. §251 (d) (2006).
365. See, e.g. In reStaats, 671 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
366. 671 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
367. M a t 1352-53.
368. /rf. at 1353.
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period 'in the course of [the] prosecution of the reissue
application.'"*^^ Further, the court held that "subsequently filed
continuation applications relate back to a previously filed application
under 35 U.S.C. § 120 only if each successive continuation
application was filed while its parent application was still pending."^™
The Federal Circuit further rejected the Board's standard that the
continuing reissue application must be related to the broadening
aspect that was identified within the two-year period because " [a] rule
requiring that the new claims be related to ¿le previously submitted
claims, or be directed to the same embodiment, would be difficult to
administer in a consistent and predictable way."*^'
Finally, in a concurring opinion. Judge O'Malley further addressed
the Board's policy concern that the broadened claims sought by
Staats in the continuing reissue application are inconsistent with the
public notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 251 because the limited life
of the additional claims sought by Staats and the protections afforded
by the intervening rights provisions in 35 U.S.C. § 252, etc., suggest
that such a policy concern, even if not overstated, "would be an
insufficient reed upon which to rest such a sweeping change in the
372

In Rates Technology v. Mediatrix Telecom, Inc.,^''^ the Federal Circuit
addressed whether the court should maintain a monetary sanction
for discovery violations against the attorney representing the
disobedient party.*'* James Hicks was the lead attorney for Rates
Technology, Inc. ("RTI"), the plaintiff in a patent infringement action
involving systems for minimizing the cost of placing long-distance
telephone calls.*'^ Over the course of the litigation, RTI was ordered
on four separate occasions to respond to a specific contention
interrogatory requested by Mediatrix.*™ Despite the repeated orders,
a magistrate judge determined that RTI never adequately responded
to the interrogatory and ultimately found the noncompliance to be
willful.*'' Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended not only
dismissal but also monetary sanctions of $86,965.81 against both Mr.
Hicks and RTI, divided evenly.*'* The district court adopted the
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1357 (O'Malley,!., concurring).
688F.3d742(Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 746-48.
Id. 3X14:4:.
Id.
Id. at 744-45.
Mat745.
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recommendation, and only Mr. Hicks appealed the monetary
sanctions imposed against him.^'^
Mr. Hicks argued that he should not be personally sanctioned, in
part because the information needed to answer the interrogatory was
not within his personal possession.^^ Additionally, Mr. Hicks argued
that the discovery orders were not directed personally toward him.^^'
The Federal Circuit rejected the arguments, noting that the record
showed both RTI and Mr. Hicks had the information necessary to
respond to Mediatrix's interrogatories "yet repeatedly and willfully
failed to provide adequate responses."•**^^ The Federal Circuit further
noted that after ordering Mr. Hicks for a fourth time to provide an
adequate response to Mediatrix's contention interrogatory, the
magistrate judge warned Mr. Hicks "that this is indeed the last
opportunity to comply with the directives of this Court and Plaintiff
proceeds at its own peril."^^^ Obviously, Mr. Hicks did not heed this
warn ing. ^^''
In Intel Corp., v. Negotiated Data Solutions, Inc.,^^^ Negotiated Data

Solutions (N-Data) accused Intel of infringing certain semiconductor
patents.^^^ Intel moved for summary judgment of license and noninfringement based on an agreement with N-Data's predecessor in
interest. National Semiconductor Corp. ("National") .^^ N-Data
countered that the patents at issue, which were created as reissues
after the patents had been assigned away by National, had never been
National's property, were N-Data's unique property rights, and
therefore were beyond the National and Intel agreement.^^ The
court's analysis centered on whether Intel's and National's intent had
been to cover reissued patents, and the court found that, under
California law, the reissued patents were included in the Intel and
National agreement.^^^
In so holding, the Federal Circuit dismissed Intel's argument that
35 U.S.C. § 252 operates to replace a patent nunc pro tune, as does a
certificate of correction.^^^ The court also determined that, contrary
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

Id.
Id. at 747.
M a t 748 n.l.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 746.
Id.
105 U.S.P.Q.2cl (BNA) 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/rf. at 1158.
Id.
Id.
M at 1160-62.
M a t 1160.
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to N-Data's interpretation, 35 U.S.C. § 251 suggests that "in the
absence of contrary language in the licensing agreement[,] a license
under the patent that is riot directed to any specific claims, field of
use, or other limited right will extend to the full extent of the
protection provided by law."^^' Finally, the court determined that,
given Intel's and National's broad licensing agreement language, the
parties intended for reissued patents to be treated as National's
patents, meaning that N-Data's reissued patents were, in fact.
In In re Yamazaki,^^^ Yamazaki appealed a decision of the Board
holding that a reissue proceeding may not be used to withdraw a
terminal disclaimer from an issued patent.^^* During prosecution of
the patent at issue, Yamazaki had submitted a terminal disclaimer
that dramatically shortened the patent's term (35 months instead of
17 years).^'^ After amending each independent claim of the
application, such that, in Yamazaki's view, the pending claims were
patentably distinct over the claims that, had been terminally
disclaimed, Yamazaki submitted the appropriate petition to withdraw
the terminal disclaimer.^^^ The PTO had not acted on Yamazaki's
petition when a Notice of Allowance was issued for the application
over a year later.^^' Yamazaki paid the requested issue fee even
though his petition to withdraw the terminal disclaimer was still
pending.^^* The PTO then dismissed Yamazaki's petition under the
theory that a recorded terminal disclaimer may not be nullified after
the patent has issued.'^^ When Yamazaki filed a reissue application
the examiner rejected the oath and declaration for failing to recite
an error upon which a reissue application could be based.'""'
Yamazaki appealed this decision to the Board, which denied his
claim.""" The Federal Circuit subsequently affirmed the Board's
rejection of the reissue application.*"^
Yamazaki argued that a terminal disclaimer alters the patent's
expiration date, not its term, which would leave the term as
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.

/d. at 1161.
Id.
104 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2024 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 2025.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2026.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2029.
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something that may be recovered by correcting an erroneous
expiration date imposed in prosecution.'**'^ The PTO argued that the
terminal disclaimer becomes part of the original patent at issuance,
fixing the patent's term and eliminating the disclaimed term.'^'* In
affirming the Board's decision, the court interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 251
and determined that the "term of the original patent" was fixed at
issuance by a terminal disclaimer.^^^ In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined 35 U.S.C. § 253, finding that a disclaimer applies to
the original term of the patent as recited in 35 U.S.C. § 251.'**'^ The
court then applied its prior interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 253 (made
in the context of claim disavowal) that disclaimed matter is treated as
if it never existed.**^^ The court found support for this interpretation
in other portions of the Patent Act relating to patent term.'***^
F. Enablement
In Edwards Lifesciences AG v. GoreValve, Inc.,'^^^ the Federal Circuit

confirmed the well-known rule that patents for drugs and medical
devices can be enabled based on animal or in vitro testing when
experimentation on humans is inappropriate.**'** Here, Edwards had
successfully implanted a stent device in a pig according to the
procedure described in the asserted patent, and the specification
explained that pigs were a standard experimental animal for heart
valve research.'"' The animal testing was held to be sufficient to
establish enablement given that human testing was not feasible.**'^
II.

UTILITY

The court tackled a plant patent case in In re Beineke,'^^^ on direct
appeal from the Board.'"'* A divided Board rejected two plant patent
applications under 35 U.S.C. § 161, which states: "[w]hoever invents
or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of
plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found
403. M a t 2027.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. /rf. at 2027-28.
407. /rf. at 2028.
408. Id.
409. 699 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petitioner cert, filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3643 (U.S.
May 6, 2013).
410. Id. at 1309; see also MPEP § 2164.02 (8th ed., Rev. Aug. 2012).
411. £:diyariis,699F.3datl310.
412. Id.
413. 690 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct. 1243 (2013).
414. M a t 1345.
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seedlings, other than . . . a plant found in an uncultivated state, may
obtain a patent therefor.'"'^^ Beineke had noticed two white oak
trees, each over 100 years old, in the front yard of someone else's
home.""® He planted acorns from the trees, asexually reproduced the
trees, and then, believing he had discovered new varieties, applied for
a plant patent for each tree.""^
The Board, relying on the 1930 Plant Patent Act"*^® and its
legislative history, found that the trees were not a "result of plant
breeding or other agricultural or horticultural efiforts" or that
Beineke had not "contributed to the creation of the plant in addition to

having appreciated its uniqueness and asexually reproduced it.'"*^®
Nor did Beineke meet the 1954 Plant Patent Act*^° additions, which
resulted in the current form of 35 U.S.C. § 161 adding the "newly
found seedlings" allowance because the original fully mature trees
were not newly found seedlings.*^^ The Board concluded that 35
U.S.C. § 161 requires that the plant be "somehow the result of human
activity," but specifically did not say how much human activity satisfies
the statute.*^^
In Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark

Office^"^^ the Federal Circuit heard an appeal over whether the
plaintiffs-appellees had standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act
to challenge patents belonging to Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the
Directors of the University of Utah Research Foundation ("Myriad").*^''
The plaintiffs-appellees asserted that claims from seven of Myriad's
patents were unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § lOl.''^^ "All but one of
the challenged method claims cover methods of 'analyzing' or
'comparing' a patient's BRCA sequence with the normal, or wild-type,
sequence to identify the presence of cancer-predisposing
mutations."*^® The last was for "a method of screening potential
cancer therapeutics.'"*" The Federal Circuit rejected these claims:

415. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006); Bánéhe, 690 F.3d at 1346.
416. 5eJneA«, 690F.3datl346.
417. Id.
418. Act of May 23,1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376.
419. Bnneke, 690 F.3d at 1348 (emphasis added).
420. Act of Sept. 3,1954, ch. 1259, 66 Stat. 804.
421. 5«jn«/i«, 690 F.3d at 1352-53.
422. /¿.at 1354.
423. 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.), ceñ. granted sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology
V. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
424. M. at 1308.
425. Id. at 1309.
426. Id.
427. M at 1310.
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Simply disagreeing with the existence of a patent on isolated DNA
sequences or even suffering an attenuated, non-proximate, effect
from the existence of a patent does not meet the Supreme Court's
requirement for an adverse legal controversy of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory

. However, with one plaintiff remaining with standing, the court
addressed the subject matter of eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.''^
The court found that the composition of matter claims are patenteligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, but distinguished this from a finding of
patentability, which was not discussed.''^ The method claims directed
toward methods of "analyzing" or "comparing" a patient's BRCA
sequence were held invalid under 35 U.S.C. § lOl.**^' As to the claim
for a method of screening potential cancer therapeutics, the court
held that it "recites patent-eligible subject matter under § lOl.'"*^^ On
April 15, 2013, the Supreme Court heard oral argument with respect
to the petitioner's first quesdon: whether human genes are patenteligible.''^^
There were two issues in Myspace, Inc. v. QraphOn Corp.'^^^ The first

one is specifically about how broad the claim term "database" should
be construed according to the specification and prosecution histories
of the patents-in-suit.**^^ Judge Mayer's dissent addresses the second
issue, which is whether there should be a particular order of applying
different standards to determine the validity of a patent.'*^^
When the Federal Circuit addressed the first issue, the majority
pointed out that the two claim construction approaches, one focusing
on the invention as it is described in the patent and the other one
focusing on the language used by the prosecuting lawyer in the
claims asserted, are not two "competing theories; rather, they are
complementary."**^^ The first approach helps understanding the
actual invention itself whereas the second approach helps
determining what precise words the inventor claimed."*^ By applying
both approaches to the instant case, the Federal Circuit concluded

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

/d. at 1323.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1333.

Id.
Id. at 1336-37.
No1. 12-398 (U.S. argued Apr. 15, 2013).

672 F.3d 1250 {Fed:Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1264 {Mayer.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1256 (majority opinion).
Id.
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that the four patents-in-suit are invalid under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103.*^«
The second issue addressed by the court was triggered by whether the
patents-in-suit claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.**°
Although the district court never decided the patentability of the
patents-in-suit under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Judge Mayer's dissenting
opinion proposed that "[t]he issue of whether a claimed method
meets the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in 35
U.S.C. § 101 is an 'antecedent question' that must be addressed
before this court can consider whether particular claims are invalid as
obvious or anticipated."**' The majority rejected Judge Mayer's
proposal for two reasons.
First, the majority revisited the
jurisprudence surrounding the patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and concluded that the courts have struggled "[w]hen it
comes to explaining what is to be understood by 'abstract ideas' in
terms that are something less than abstract."**^ On the one hand, the
majority characterized the jurisprudence under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a
"murky morass," while on the other hand the majority argued that
the validity criteria under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 are better
developed and more readily understood, and if properly applied,
only address the limited facts of the case at issue**^ Second, the
majority contended that in the iriterest of pubhc policy, courts that
"avoid the swamp of verbiage that is 35 U.S.C. § 101 by exercising
their inherent power to control the processes of litigation" would
"make patent litigation more efficient, conserve judicial resources,
and bring a degree of certainty to the interests of both patentees and
their competitors in the marketplace."***
The topic of patent-eligible subject matter arose once again in CLS
Bank International v. Alice Corp.'^'^^ The claims at issue recited a

method, a data processing system, and a computer program product,
all directed at the problem of mitigating settlement risk between
financial institutions.**** The question before the court was whether
the claims fell into a statutory category of patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (e.g., a process) or whether the claims
439. Id. at 1257-58; see also 35 U.S.G. §§ 102(b), 103(a) (2006) (describing how
patents are invalid when they are either anticipated or obvious as discerned from the
invention itself and the words used to describe it in the claims).
440. Myspace, 672 F.3d at 1258.
441. /á. at 1264 (Mayer,J., dissenting).
442. Id. at 1259 (majority opinion).
443. /d. at 1260.
444. Id.
445. 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Gir.), reh'g en bane granted, 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
446. M at 1343.
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fell into one of the judicially created exceptions to patent-eligible
subject matter that are "implicit" in the statute (e.g., abstract
ideas) .*^^ In ruling that Alice's claims were, in fact, directed towards
patent-eligible subject matter, the majority opinion urged separation
of analysis under the four major statutory provisions Üiat determine
whether a patent is valid (§§ 101, 102, 103 and 112).'"« The majority
stated, "[i]t should be self-evident that each of these four statutory
provisions—§§ 101, 102, 103 and 112—serves a different purpose and
plays a distincdy different role.'"*^^
A dissenting opinion by Judge Prost, on the other hand, suggested
that the "majority resists the Supreme Court's unanimous directive to
apply the patentable subject matter test with more vigor.'"*^" This case
has been granted en bane rehearing and thus the decision has been
d*^^
III. INFRINGEMENT
A.

General Infringement Cases .

The court twice addressed the patent in Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc. V. W.L. Gore àf Associates, Inc.^^^ On initial appeal, a divided panel
held that the patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 6,436,135 (the '135
patent) is valid and was willfully infringed, and that the trial court
"did not abuse its discretion in awarding enhanced damages,
attorneys' fees and costs, and an ongoing royalty.'"^^^ An en bane
court returned the case to the panel for reconsideration on the issues
of willfulness and the standard of review to be applied for
willfulness.^^**

447. See id. at 1345-47 (discussing the district court's analysis of the four claims for
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the abstract concept framework as well as
its ultimate finding that all four patent claims were directed to an abstract concept).
448. /a. at 1348,1352-56.
449. Id. at 1348; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing a broad framework for
assessing patent validity); id. § 102 (requiring novelty in so far as a patent cannot be
previously known or used); id. § 103 (dictating that a valid patent must not be
obvious); id. § 112 (mandating a certain level of specificity both as to the invention
and the claim).
450. CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1356 (Prost, J., dissenting) (pointing to several recent
35 U.S.C. § 101 cases in which the Supreme Court suggested that the Federal Circuit
needs to better define its subject matter patentability test).
451. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
452. 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane), cert, denied sub nom. W.L. Gore &
Assocs. V. C.R. Bard, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 932 (2013); 670 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
453. Bard Peripheral, 670 F.3d at 1193.
454. Bard Peripheral, 682 F.3d at 1005.
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The Federal Circuit noted that "[t]he ultimate question of
willfulness has long been treated as a question of fact."*^^ However,
the court has not yet articulated the standard applicable to Seagate's
objective test, which overruled the Federal Circuit's negligence
standard for willfulness.*^® Seagate stands for the proposition that
proof of willful patent infringement requires a showing of
recklessness, which is established through a two-prong test: (1) "a
patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions
constituted infringement of a valid patent"; and (2) "the patentee
must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused
infringer."*" Further, the Federal Circuit stated "[a]fter reviewing
the Supreme Court's precedent in similar contexts, as well as our
own, we conclude that simply stating that willfulness is a question of
fact oversimplifies the issue."*^^
The Federal Circuit stated that the court is best suited for mziking
reasonableness determinations.*^' Specifically, a judge is in the best
position to mzike objective determinations of recklessness as a question
of law subject to de novo review, despite underlying mixed questions of
law 2ind fact.*®" This holding is consistent with those in parallel zureas of
law, such as exceptional cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285,*®' and the
Supreme Court's precedent on "sham" litigation.*®^ "Having clarified
the legal standard for Seagate's objective willfulness prong, we
conclude that remand is appropriate so that the trial court may apply
the correct standard to the question of willfulness in the first
instance."*®' Further, the court notes that on remand, the question
should be "whether a reasonable litigant could realistically expect" to
prevail under the asserted defenses.*®* "If, in view of the facts, the
asserted defenses were not reasonable, only then can the jury's
subjective willfulness finding be reviewed for substantial evidence."*®^

455. 7d. at 1006.
456. Id. at 1005-06; see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (en bane).
457. Bard Peripheral, 682 F.3d at 1005 (quoting Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371).
458. M a t 1006.
459. Id.
460. /d. at 1007.
461. See infra notes 486-99 and accompanying text (explaining the Federal
Circuit's rationale for what constitutes an "exceptional" case under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
462. Bard Peripheral Vascular Inc., 682 F.3d at 1007.
463. Id. at 1008 (citing Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 443 (2000)).
464. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
465. Id.
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In 3M Go. V. Avery Dennison Gorp.,^^ 3M Company (3M) appealed

the district court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action for
lack of case-or-controversy.**^' The Federal Circuit reiterated that the
question to be asked in determining whether a declaratory judgment
satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement is "whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment.'"^ In this case, 3M alleged the following facts:
(1) a history of patent litigation existed between the two companies
(albeit unrelated to the patents-in-suit) ;**^^
(2) Avery Dennison Corp. ("Avery") had filed a reissue application
for both of the patents-in-suit, presumably to place the applications in
better condition for litigation;'"^ and
(3) Avery's chief intellection property counsel made statements
that 3M's products "may infringe," that "licenses are available," and
that Avery would "send claim charts.'"*^'
3M argued that these facts would support the case-or-controversy
requirement.''^^ The Federal Circuit noted that the first two alleged
facts would not support 3M's position because of the presumptions
that must be made in order to do so.**" Nonetheless, the court ruled
that the third fact, if true, would support the case-or-controversy
requirement."'"* In doing so, the court stated that the use of the
words "may infringe" rather than "does infringe" is immaterial,
because otherwise declaratory judgments could be defeated by
avoiding "magic words/"*'^
At issue in Meyer Intellectual Properties Ltd. v. Bodum, Inc.^"^^ were

method claims, asserted by Meyer, describing methods for frothing
milk using a container with a plunger/'^ The Federal Circuit noted
that the claims were generally broken into four steps: "(1) providing
a container that has a height to diameter aspect ratio of 2:1; (2)
pouring liquid (e.g., milk) into the container; (3) introducing a
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

673 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/rf. at 1374.
Id. at 1376 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (1941)).
/d. at 1374.
Id.
/á. at 1375.
/¿.at 1377.
/a. at 1380.
/d. at 1381.
/d. at 1379.
690 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1359-60.
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plunger that includes at least a rod and plunger body with a screen;
and (4) pumping the plunger to aerate the liquid.'"*™ No apparatus
claims were at issue. At least three of the steps, with the possible
exception of the "providing"*™ step, would necessarily be performed
by an end-user ofthe container (e.g., a customer who had purchased
such a container sold by Bodum).''*° The Federal Circuit concluded
that Meyer had presented no evidence of direct infringement within
the United States either by Bodum (e.g., during testing of their
marketed product) or by an end-user."**^ Moreover, the court
rejected the argument that a method is assumed to have been
performed by an end-user of an apparatus simply because the
apparatus was sold with instructions for use detailing the method.*^^
Thus, Meyer had not shown by a preponderance of evidence, rather
than an assumption based on an instruction manual, that direct
infringement of a method claim occurred within the United States in
order to prove induced infringement by the manxifacturer of the
apparatus.**^ The Federal Circuit reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part,
and remanded.***
In Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.,*^^ the

Federal Circuit determined what constitutes an "exceptional" case
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.**^ Highmark filed suit against Allcare seeking
a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and
unenforceability ofall claims of U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105 (the '105
patent).**' Following transfer to another district court, Allcare
counterclaimed for infringement.*** Highmark filed a motion for
summary judgment of non-infringement, which the district court
granted and which was aJBirmed on appeal without opinion.**® While
the previous appeal was pending before the Federal Circuit,
478. Id.
479. The term "providing a container" was not construed by the district court.
However, the Federal Circuit construed the term "providing" to mean "furnishing,
supplying, making available, or preparing" and found that either Bodum or the end
user could satisfy the providing step. Id. at 1369.
480. Id.
481. M at 1371.
482. Id.
483. This decision was announced two weeks before the August 31, 2012 decision
rendered in the en bane rehearing of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane) (per curiam). See infra notes 539-50
and aeeompanying text (diseussing Akamai).
484. Bodum, 690 F.3d at 1379.
485. 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert, filed, 81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar.
25,2013) (No. 12-1163).
486. Id. at 1308.
487. Id. at 1306-07.
488. M a t 1307.
489. Id.
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Highmark moved for an exceptional case finding and attorneys' fees
and expenses under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and also for Rule 11 sanctions
against Allcare's attorneys.'*^** The district court found the case
exceptional because it concluded that Allcare had pursued frivolous
infringement claims, asserted meridess legal positions during
litigation, changed its claim construction positions, and made
misrepresentations regarding a motion to transfer venue.'*^^
It is established law under section 285 that absent misconduct in
the course of the litigation or in securing the patent, sanctions may
be imposed against the patentee only if two separate criteria are
satisfied; (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and
(2) the litigation is objectively baseless.''^^

An infringement allegation is objectively baseless when a
reasonable litigant could not expect success on the merits.**^^ This
standard applies for both patentees and alleged infringers.'*^^ Citing
Bard, the court noted that the "objectively baseless" prong is a
question of law based on underlying mixed questions of law and fact,
which must be made by the court as a matter of law, and not by the
j * ^ ^
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285, but limited the finding to
Allcare's allegations of infringement of claim 102 of the '105
patent.**^^ The court reversed the district court's exceptional finding
for all of Allcare's other claims and actions.**^' The Federal Circuit
then remanded the case to the district court to determine the
amount of attorneys' fees apportionable to only the frivolity of
Allcare's allegations of infringement of claim 102 of the '105
patent.'*^^ A petition for panel rehearing was denied.**^
The Federal Circuit addressed an appeal of an ITC decision about
two patents in General Electric Co. v. International Trade Commission}^^

For U.S. Patent No. 7,321,221 (the '221 patent), the case turned on
490. Id.
491. /d. at 1307-08.
492. /d. at 1308.
493. Id. at 1309 (quoting Dominant Semiconductors Sdn. Bhd. v. OSRAM GmbH,
524 F.3d 1254, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. /d. at 1319.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en bane) (per curiam), petition for cert,filed,81 U.S.L.W. (U.S. Mar. 25, 2013)
(No. 12-1163).
500. 685F.3dl034(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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whether a pre-set period of time could be a proxy for measurement
of a current at a predetermined value.^"' General Electric (GE)
asserted a claim drawn toward a wind turbine that included a
protective decoupling, which would be recoupled when high currents
were generated (e.g., during a short circuit) and lowered to a
predetermined value.^"^ Thé Federal Circuit observed that "[n]o
embodiment in the patent, no drawing, no circuitry, shows
recoupling solely after a predetermined period of time."^"^ Pursuant
to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, the court concluded that "a possibly
broader disclosure accompanied by an explicit narrow claim shows
the inventor's selection of the narrow claim scope."^°* After finding
that the specification excludes ä pre-set period of tinie from being
used for a claim limitation of a predetermined value for a current,
the court then determined that Mitsubishi, the alleged intervenor,
does not infringe GE's '221 patent claim because Mitsubishi's
turbines do not measure current (or any proxy, such as voltage) and
only wait for a given time period to recouple.^"^
With regards to the second patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,921,985 (the
'985 patent), the court reversed the ITC's finding that GE's products
do not practice the claim at issue and that there is no domestic
industry.^"^ Citing earlier precedent, the court reiterated that the
term "coupled" requires only a connection, which does not have to
be a mechanical or physical connection, such as an electrical
connection in a circuit.^"^ Although Mitsubishi asserted that the
modifications made in GE's products may be separately patentable,
the court repeated well-settled patent law in holding that "a
separately patented invention niay indeed be within the scope of the
claims of a dominating patent."^"* Emphasizing that the patent's
scope is determined independent of whether other aspects of the
technology are otherwise patented, the court explained that "[t]he
domestic industry requirement is not negated if the "technology as
501. /d. at 1039.
502. Id.
503. /d. at 1041.
504. Id. Paragraph 2 of 35 U.S.C. § 112 states that "[t]he specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
(2006).
505. Gen. Elec, 685 F.3d at 1041-42.
506. M a t 1046.
507. Id. at 1045 (quoting Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175
F.3d 985, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
508. Id. at 1046 (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d
1569, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
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employed in the domestic industry has been modified from its form
when the patent was obtained."^°^
In Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.^'" (Apple II), the Federal

Circuit held that "irreparable harm" requires a causal nexus between
the allegedly infringing feature of an accused product and sales of
those products.^" In a previous and small episode in the ongoing
patent litigation between Apple and Samsung, Apple 7,^'^ the issue
before the Federal Circuit was whether Apple should be entided to a
preliminary injunction against Samsung's smartphones and tablets
for allegedly infringing four of Apple's patents (three design patents
and one utility patent).^'^ In particular, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that "[w]hile the appeal presents substantial issues of law
and fact, the decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction is one
that is committed to the discretion of the district court, which makes
the appellant's task in overturning that decision a difficult one."^'''
The court reviewed the district court's application of the
traditional four-factor analysis for preliminary injunctive relief to
each of the four Apple patents-in-suit and found that an injunction
should be entered for one of the patents.^'^ The court found that
three of the four Apple patents failed the four-factor analysis because
Apple did not prove that it would suffer irreparable harm without the
preliminary injunction.^'^ For the two design patents-in-suit, the
court concluded that "[a] mere showing that Apple might lose some
insubstantial market share as a result of Samsung's infringement is
not enough."^'^ Further, the court agreed with the district court's
assessment that even assuming that "brand dilution" could arise from
design patent infringement, "Apple has not demonstrated that brand
dilution is likely to occur."^'^ With respect to the only utility patentin-suit, the court concluded that "the evidence that Samsung's
employees believed it to be important to incorporate the patented
feature into Samsung's products" is relevant, but not dispositive,
because "the relevant inquiry [should] focus on the objective reasons

509. Id.
510. 695F.3dl370(Fed. Cir. 2012).
511. /d. at 1376.
512. 678F.3dl314{Fed. Cir. 2012).
513. /d. at 1319.
514. M a t 1316.
515. Id. at 1332. The court aíFirmed the denial of injunctive relief for the other
three patents, /d. at 1333.
516. /rf. at 1323-33.
517. /d. at 1324-25.
518. /d. at 1325.
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as to why the patentee lost sales, not on the infringer's subjective
behefs as to why it gained them (or would be likely to gain them)."^'^
In his dissent. Judge O'Malley found the remand of one of the
patents to the district court unwarranted because "(1) remand will
cause unnecessary delay, which is inconsistent with the very purpose
of preliminary injunctive relief; and (2) once we reject its validity
analysis, the district court's decision, taken in its entirety, reveals that
all of the prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief are
satisfied. "^2°
In Apple II, the claims in the patent at issue disclosed the value of
Siri, including the "unified search" ability to access multiple data
storage locations at once.^^' According to Apple's own survey, the
accused "unified search" feature in the asserted patent was not one of
the top five reasons consumers bought the accused Samsung
phones.*^^ According to the court, not being in the top five was "too
tenuous" to establish a causal link between the alleged infringement
and consumer demand, and therefore was inadequate to support a
fmding of irreparable harm.^^^ If this opinion becomes the general
rule, it will limit access to injunctions for many patents that claim
non-dominant features.
The Federal Circuit also concluded that "a plurality o/heuristic
modules" meant all heuristic modules.^^"* According to the claim
language, each of the heuristic modules must employ a different
heuristic algorithm.^^^ Apple thus argued that if an accused product
had some plurality of heuristic modules, each with a different
heuristic algorithm, then the product would satisfy the claim
language.*^® The court said no, concluding that a "plurality" referred
to aU heuristic modules, and thus every one of the heuristic modules
must employ a different heuristic algorithm.^"
Under this
construction by the Eederal Gircuit, an infringing product could be
converted into a non-infringing product by adding another heuristic
module.*^* That is, if the added heuristic module has a heuristic
algorithm that matches one of the existing algorithms, the modified
product would not infringe (even though the claim uses
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

/d. at 1327-28.
Id. at 1333-34 (O'Malley, T., concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part).
Applell, 695 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
W. at 1373, 1379.
/d. at 1379.
Id.
5eeid. atl373.
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"comprising").^^^ Because the claim construction portion of this
opinion was not required for the holding (the reversal of the
preliminary injunction was based on an inability to show irreparable
harm), future panels of the Federal Circuit are likely to ignore this
claim construction that turns "a plurality" into "all."^^°
In Arcelormittal France v. AK Steel Corp.,^^^ the Federal Circuit

reaffirmed the primacy of the intrinsic evidence, even when it is in
conflict with a well established industry standard.^^^ The technology
at issue was a method for forming steel sheet.^^^ In the industry, the
ordinary meaning of "hot-rolled steel sheet" precludes subsequent
cold-rolling.^^'* Indeed, experts for both parties as well as a leading
steel-making treatise confirmed this industry norm.^^^
Citing Phillips V. AWH Corp.,^^^ the court emphasized that the
specification is the primary guide to claim interpretation.^^^ In
particular, the specification of the asserted patent included many
citations to an optional cold-rolling step after hot rolling, including
"the sheet according to the invention . . . may be cold-rerolled again
depending on the final thickness desired. "^^ The court reversed the
previous ruling by refocusing the claim construction process on a
more detailed analysis of the patent specification, and moving away
from previous panel decisions' heavy reliance on dictionaries.
Akamai Technolog, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.,^^^ presented the

court with the opportunity to reconcile two rules with its decision. First,
that direct infringement requires a single entity to perform all the steps
of a claimed method. Second, that there can be no indirect
infringement in the absence of direct infringement.^*"^ The majority
opinion did not provide an answer, leaving the law of divided
infringement untouched as it applies to liability for direct infringement
under 35 USC § 271 (a) .^'" The decision instead was directed to liability
with respect to inducement under 35 USC § 271 (b). The majority
529. See id.
530. 5iei"rf. at 1373-77.
531. 700 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
532. /rf. at 1319-21.
533. M a t 1317-18.
534. W. at 1320.
535. Id.
536. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane).
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane) (per curiam), cert, denied, 133 S. Ct.
1521 (2013); 133 S. Ct. 1520 (2013).
540. M at 1314.
541. Id. at 1307; see alsoW. Keitb Robinson, No "Direction" Home: An Alternative
Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U . L. REV. 59, 97-99 (2012) (criticizing the court
for leaving these issues unanswered).
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looked to statutory construction, precedent, legislative history,
analogous fields of law, and patent policy in reaching its decision.^^^
As set forth in the opinion, nothing in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) invokes a
limitation to infringement by a sole entity; rather, inducement of patent
infringement "refer[s] most naturally to the acts necessary to infringe a
patent, not to whether those acts are perforaied by one entity or
several. "*^^ The court noted that the text of the statute made no
reference as to the number of entities required for inducement, while
also focusing on the textual differences between 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) and
the inducement provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b).^"" Section 271 (a)
provides that a person who performs the acts specified in the statute
"infringes the patent,"^« and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) provides that
whoever "actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.""^ The court focused on this distinction and indicated
that requiring proof that there has been direct infringement as a
predicate for induced infringement is not the same as requiring
proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer.^^'
Infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b) thus refers to the acts
necessary to infringe the patent, not to the number of entities that
perform those acts.^"*®
In the end, the court ultimately reversed and remanded the case
for further proceedings on the theory of induced infringement, with
instructions to the district court on the necessary proof required.^"*^
The court held that Limelight can be liable for inducing
infringement if it can be shown that: (1) Limelight knew of Akamai's
patent; (2) Limelight performed all but one of the steps of the
method claimed in the patent; (3) Limelight induced the content
providers to perform the final step of the claimed method; and (4)
the content providers in fact performed that final

542. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1307-13 (comparing the structure of 35 U.S.G. § 271 (a)
and 35 U.S.G. § 271 (b), analyzing legislative history of the Patent Act, and drawing
on tort law).
543. M at 1309.
544. Id. at 1307-08.
545. 35 U.S.G. § 271 (a) (2006).
546.

«.§271(0).

547.
548.
549.
550.

Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308.
/d. at 1309.
Id. at 1318-19.
/d. at 1318.
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Secondary Infringment

Toshiba Corp. v. Imation Corp.^^^ involves the alleged infringement by
Imation of several patent claims concerning how data is written onto
a DVD, specifically, claims that required the writing of a test pattern
and lead-out area onto a DVD.^^^ The Federal Circuit found that
unfinalized DVDs do not include such a test pattern or lead-out area,
and that Toshiba had failed to meet its burden to put forth evidence
that the use of unfinalized DVDs was not substantial.^''^ Therefore, as
Toshiba failed to show there was no substantial non-infringing use,
the court held that Toshiba failed to prove contributory
infringement.^"''
However, the court also held that "the existence of a substantial
non-infringing use does not preclude a finding of inducement,"
finding the district court to have erred as a matter of law by holding
otherwise.^^''' Also, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to direct
infringement, which can be shown by circumstantial evidence
including that "at least one person direcdy infringed an asserted
claim during the relevant time period."^^^
With regard to claim construction, the court agreed with Toshiba's
argument that the district court improperly read a "purpose" into the
structural elements of the asserted claims.'^'^' The court reasoned that
the asserted claims were not limited to a multirsideá disc, even if all of
the embodiments shown in the specification were of multi-sided discs,
because the court does not read limitations from the specification
into the
^
C. Doctrine ofEquivalents

In Deere àf Co. v. Bush Hog, LLC,^^^ the Federal Circuit addressed
when the doctrine of equivalents would "vitiate" a claim element.^^
The district court had construed the claim term "into engagement
with" to require direct contact between two deck walls.^^' The district
court reasoned that the deck walls either were in direct contact or
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.

681 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/ii. at 1361.
/rf. at 1362-63.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
Id.
/rf. at 1368.
/rf. at 1368-69.
104 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1884.
Id. at 1882.

2013]

2012 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

883

were not, so applying the doctrine of equivalents would impermissibly
vitiate the "into engagement with" claim limitation.^^^
The Federal Circuit warned against viewing a claim limitation as a
"binary" choice.^''^ In particular, "the doctrine of equivalents, by
definition, recognizes that an element is missing that mUst be
supplied by the equivalent substitute."^" In this case, a reasonable
jury could conclude that a small spacer connecting the two deck walls
"represents an insubstantial difference from direct contact. "^®^
As the Federal Circuit explained here, "vitiation" is not an
exception to the doctrine of equivalents, but a legal conclusion after
applying the "insubstantial differences" test or the "function, way,
result" test.^^^ For example, "where the accused device contain [s] the
antithesis of the claimed structure," the proposed equivalent fails
both of these tests, and is thus not an equivalent.*"
In Energy Transportation Group, Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S,

WDH Inc.,^^ two patents based on the same original apphcation
received different treatment under the doctrine of equivalents, which
provides that if the accused device may still infringe the claim if they
share every element.*^" For both patents, the jury found no Hteral
infringement, which the Federal Circuit affirmed."" However, the
jury found that Demant infringed the claims of the '850 Patent under
the doctrine of equivalents while the '749 Patent did not violate the
doctrine."'
The technology of the patents reduced acoustic feedback in
programmable digital hearing aids.*'^ At the time the original
application was filed in 1986, the programming of the hearing aids
was performed by an external computer, refiecting the size and
complexity of computing devices at that time.*^^ Advances in
computer technology allowed the accused devices to relocate the
programming into the hearing aid itself.^''' Nonetheless, the court
562. Id.
563. ,M. at 1886.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. (citing Planet Bingo, LLC v. Gametech Int'l, Inc., 472 F.3d 1338, 1345
(Fed. Cir. 2006).
568. 697 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert, denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Apr. 22,
2013).
569. /d. at 1352-54, 1358-59.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. / ¿ a t 1347.
573. M at 1349.
574. Id. at 1353-54 (explaining that the accused device continuously recalculated
filter coefficients through electronics inside the hearing aid); see also Hughes Aircraft
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held that the accused device performed the same function as the '850
patent, and in substantially the same way and with the same result.^^^
The Federal Circuit thus confirmed infiingement of one of the '850
patent under the doctrine of equivalents.^^^
For the '749 patent, however, prosecution history estoppel
precluded the application of the doctrine of equivalents to a key
claim limitation.^'' During prosecution, the claims were amended to
require "measuring phase and amplitude" of received signals, which
was not performed by the accused devices.^'® The court explained
that it requires "a strong showing—not present on this record—to
satisfy the 'very narrow' exception to prosecution history estoppel for
amendments only tangentially related to the equivalent in
question."^'^
The court did not accept the plaintiffs argument that the
amendment just addressed the examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection
by "clarifying" how and where a certain operation
^
IV. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

In 1st Media, LLG v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,^^^ the Federal Circuit

reversed the district court's decision of inequitable conduct based on
a failure to prove deliberate fraud under the standard oudined in the
court's previous Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson àf Go.^^^
1st Media, LLC ("1st Media") is the assignee of U.S. Patent No.
5,464,946 (the '926 patent), titled "System and Apparatus for
Interactive Multimedia Entertainment."^^"^ On November 13, 1992,
Sawyer filed the application on behalf of an inventor, Lewis, and
during the prosecution of the application. Sawyer also prosecuted
other related patent applications for Lewis, including International
Patent Application No. PCT/US93/10930 (the "PCT application");
the application that became U.S. Patent No. 5,325,423 (the '423
patent); and the application that became U.S. Patent No. 5,564,001
Co. V. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (relocating satellite control
functions from ground control stations to the satellites).
575. Energy Tramp., 697 F.3d at 1354.
576. /rf. at 1352-54.
577. /rf. at 1358-60.
578. Id.
579. /¿.at 1359.
580. Id.
581. 694F.Sdl367(Fed. Cir. 2012).
582. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en bane).
583. 1st Media, 694 F.3d at 1369.
584. Id.
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(the '001 patent) .^^^ Sawyer or Lewis, however, did not disclose Bush,
Baji, or Hoarty references cited in the PCT application, the '423
patent, or the '001 patent, respectively.^*^
On November 29, 2007, 1st Media sued Electronic Arts, Inc.
("Electronic Arts") for infringement of the '946 patent, and
Electronic Arts asserted an inequitable conduct defense, based
particularly on the failure to cite the three references.^*^
During trial in the district court, Lewis and Sawyer both testified
that they did not appreciate the materiality of the omitted
references.^^^ Specifically, Lewis testified that "nondisclosure of the
Bush reference was 'an oversight that got lost in the cracks at that
time and wasn't a conscious decision not to report [it].'"^®^ Sawyer, in
his previous declaration, claimed "the Bush publication itself never
sparked an awareness or belief in my mind that Bush should be
disclosed."^^° With respect to the Baji and Hoarty. reference, Lewis
and Sawyer testified that the technology in the applications that led
to the '423 and '001 patents was so distinct from ¿le '946 patent that
it did not occur to them to disclose these references.^^' Nonetheless,
the district court concluded that these explanations were not credible
in view of the extensive overlap in the applications and claims.^^^ The
district court found that Lewis and Sawyer knew that the references
were material, and further inferred intent to deceive the PTO during
prosecution.^®^ The district court therefore held the '946 patent
unenforceable for inequitable conduct.^®* 1st Media appealed the
district court's decision.^®*
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted, "Therasense expliâned that in
order to show that the patentee acted with the specific intent to
deceive the PTO, a defendant must prove 'that the applicant knew of
the reference, knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision
to withhold it.'"^^^ The court further stated, "[a] court can no longer
infer intent to deceive from non-disclosure of a reference solely

585. Id. at 1369-70.
586. Id. at 1370.
587. « . a t 1370-71.
588. M at 1371.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 1371-72.
593. /¿.at 1372.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. Id. (quoting Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
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because that reference was known and material."^^^ Moreover, the
court confirmed, "a patentee need not offer any good faith
explanation for his conduct unless and until an accused infringer has
met his burden to prove an intent to deceive by clear and convincing
In this case, the court found that the record contained no evidence
that Lewis or Sawyer deliberately withheld the three references
because evidence of selective disclosure was not present.^^ The court
therefore determined that the district court clearly erred in relying
on the inability to offer a good faith explanation as a basis to infer a
deliberate decision to withhold evidence of the references.^" The
court reversed the district court's decision of inequitable conduct.^'
In Outside the Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc.,^"^ the

Federal Circuit again reversed the district court's decision of
inequitable conduct based on a failure to prove deliberate fraud.^^
During the declaratory judgment patent suit filed by Outside the
Box Innovations, LLC against Travel Caddy, the district court
determined Travel Caddy's United States Patent No. 6,823,992 (the
'992 patent) and its continuation Patent No. 6,991,104 (the '104
patent) unenforceable "on the grounds that (1) Travel Caddy did not
disclose to the PTO the existence of the litigation on the '992 patent
during prosecution of the '104 application, and (2) Travel Caddy
paid small entity fees to the PTO but was not entitled to small entity
status."^"
With respect to the failure to disclose the existence of the litigation
of the '992 patent, the district court inferred deceptive intent from
the fact of non-disclosure, stating:
The Court infers from the facts in evidence that Travel Caddy
intended to deceive the PTO when it failed to disclose the current
litigation during the pendency of the '104 Patent. Nelson drafted
the '104 and '992 Patents, was the prosecuting attorney for both .
patents, and has been heavily involved as counsel in the current
litigation. Furthermore, Nelson is clearly an experienced patent
attorney and testified as to his awareness of Rule 56 and Section

597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.
604.
605.

Id. at 1372-73.
Id. at 1373.
M a t 1375.
Id.
/rf. at 1377.
695 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
M at 1292.
Id. at 1289-90.
/¿.at 1290.
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The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed and concluded that the
district court's ruling of inequitable conduct was in error because
there was not clear and convincing evidence of withholding of
information material to patentability of the claims in the application
as required by the decision in Therasense.^^ Specifically, the Federal
Circuit determined that there was no suggestion of deliberate action
to withhold it in order to deceive the PTO examiner.^"'
With respect to claiming small entity status and paying reduced
PTO fees, the Federal Circuit again determined that this ruling was in
error in view of the lack of suggestion of deliberate action to withhold
information to pay the reduced PTO fees.®"^ The Federal Circuit
therefore reversed and vacated the district court's decision of
inequitable conduct and unenforceability of the patents at issue.®"^
V.

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

A.

Claim Language

In In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,^^° the Federal Circuit vacated the

Board's rejection of the claims on the ground that the Board's
construction of the claims was "unreasonable and inconsistent with
the specification."^'' The case involved numerous claims on two
patents owned by Abbott—U.S. Patents Nos. 6,175,752 (the '752
patent) and 6,565,509 (the '509 patent) .^'^ The two patents contain a
common specification that describes "methods and devices for
monitoring glucose levels for diabetics," primarily through contact
pads placed on the skin.^'^ The claimed sensor, unit or assembly
comprises an "electrochemical sensor," and the claimed sensor unit
further recites that the electrochemical sensor is "in a substantially
fixed position."^'*
The Board determined whether the claims were anticipated
through a two-step analysis. The first step is to • perform a claim
construction analysis, and the second step involves comparing the
claims to the prior art.®'* Claim construction is a question of law
606. Id. at 1291.
607. Id. at 1292.
608. Id. at 1294-95.
609. Id. at 1289.
610. 696 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
611. Id. at 1151.
612. Id. at 1143.
613. Id. at 1143-44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
614. Id. at 1144 (emphasis omitted); U.S. Patent No. 6,565,509 (filed Sept. 21,
2000); U.S. Patent No. 6,175,752 (filed Apr. 30,1998).
615. SeeinreAoyama,656 F.3d 1293, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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reviewed de novo.^'^ Thus, in Abbott, the Board first had to determine
the correct construction of the terms "electrochemical sensor" and
"substantially fixed position," and specifically whether proper
construction ofthe former term includes wires and cable.^^'
The only mention of cables and wires in the Abbott patents'
specification is a statement criticizing the external cables and wires of
the prior art, and the embodiments in Abbott's patents do not
include any external cables or wires connecting to the sensor control
unit.^'^ Nonetheless, the Board determined that in the absence of a
more express limiting statement, the broadest reasonable
interpretation consistent with the specification included the external
cables and wires.^'^ The Board also found that the term "substantially
fixed" would be understood "to allow for some movement sensor
relative to the position of the sensor control unit."^^° Having
construed the claims, the Board concluded that the wires of a prior
art are part of the recited sensor and that, although the wires allow
for some movement, "they are still somewhat restrained in
movement, and are therefore 'substantially fixed'" as recited in the
claims ' at issue.^^' Thus, the Board affirmed the examiner's
rejections.^^^ Abbott filed requests for rehearing, but the Board
rejected Abbott's request for the same reasons.^^^.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Abbott argued that the Board
improperly relied on language in its specifications.^^"* The Federal
Circuit agreed with Abbott and vacated the Board's decisions as to
the patentability of Abbott's independent claims at issue and ordered
the Board to apply the correct claim construction on remand.^^^ In
making the decision, the Federal Circuit recognized that the
specification "does not contain an explicit statement disclaiming
electrochemical sensors with external cables or wires."^^^ The court,
however, pointed out its prior decision in Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar
Satellite Gorp.,^^'^ which held that "[e]ven when guidance is not
provided in explicit definitional format, 'the specification may define
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

See id.

A¿íAo«, 696 F.3d at 1146.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d. at 1147.
Id.
/d. at 1147-48.
Id.
/d. at 1150.
/d. at 1149.
383 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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claim terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or
ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.'"^^^ Thus, the
court determined that in the case at hand, an explicit disavowal was
not necessary because the specifications "repeatedly, consistently, and
exclusively" depict an electrochemical sensor without external cables
With respect to the Board's prior construction of the term
"substantially fixed," the issue was "whether 'some movement'
includes the degree of movement in the [prior art] such that the
sensor need only be 'somewhat restrained.'"®^" The Federal Gircuit
disagreed with the Board and concluded that the degree of
movement allowed in the prior art exceeds both the movement
allowable under the Board's construction of the term "substantially
fixed" and the movement described in the specification.®^'
In Fh Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos,^^^ the Federal Gircuit
addressed when provisions of 35 U.S.G. § 112, 1 6 apply to a claim
limitation.®^^ The basic rule is simple: "use of the word 'means' creates
a rebuttable presumption that the drafter intended to invoke 35 U.S.G.
§ 112, H 6, while failure to use the word 'means' creates the rebuttable
presumption that the drafter did not intend the claims to be governed
by 35 U.S.G. § 112, H 6."®^* In particular, in the absence of the term
"means," the court is unwilling to apply 35 U.S.G. § 112, H 6 "without a
showing that the limitation is devoid of anything that can be
construed as structure."®^^
Here, Flo Healthcare had a patent in inter partes reexamination,®^®
and an important term affecting patentability was "a height adjustment
mechanism for altering the height of the horizontal tray."®^^ Without
the magic word "means," the Federal Gircuit imposed the strong
presumption against invoking 35 U.S.G. § 112, \ 6.®*^ Although the
generic term "mechanism" conveys no structure by itself, the term
"height adjustment mechanism" conveyed enough structure.®^^ The
term "height adjustment mechanism" appeared in the vmtten
628. Id. at 1300 (quoting Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc'ns Grp.,
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258,1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
629. Abbott, 696 F.3d at 1150 (quoting Iredto, 383 F.3d at 1303).
630. /d. at 1150-51.
631. /d. at 1151.
632. 697 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
633. /d. at 1372-73.
634. Id. at 1373.
635. Id. at 1374.
636. /d. at 1369.
637. /d. at 1372.
638. /d. at 1373-74.
639. /d. at 1374-75.
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description twenty-four times, designating structures including "a
rack and pinion mechanism, a cable and pulley mechanism, a ratchet
mechanism, a ball screw mechanism."^** The court also looked at
dictionaries, and concluded that the word "adjustment" conveyed
^'
structure.^'
In sum, the Federal Circuit really does limit the application of 35
U.S.C. § 112, K 6 when the claim language does not include the word
In Thomer v. Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC,^^ Thomer

appealed the district court's construction of the terms "attached to
said pad" and "flexible" in its patent asserted against Sony.^ Because
the losing party asked the Federal Circuit to review the claim
construction, case law did not preclude the Federal Circuit from
deciding these claim construction issues that were not implicated by
the district court's judgment.^^
The district court had limited the word "attached" to mean
attached to the outside of an object, because (according to the
district court) the specification "consistently use[d] the term
'attached* to indicate affixing an actuator to the outer surface of an
object and use[d] the term 'embedded' when referring to an
actuator inside an object."^^ On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted
that the words of a claim are generally given their ordinary meaning
except "[(1)] when a patentee sets out a defmition and acts as his
own lexicographer, or [(2)] when the patentee disavows the full
scope of a claim term either in the specification or during
prosecution."^'
The court found that the use of the term "attached" in Thorner's
specification did not meet either of these exceptions.^^ With regard
to the first exception, "the patentee must 'clearly express an intent'
to redefine the term"; it is not enough to use a word in the same
manner in all embodiments.^^ Based on its findings that the
specification did not redefine "attached," nor (from the second

640. M a t 1374.
641. Id
642. Id.
643. 669 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
644. M a t 1364-65.
645. Id. at 1369. The parties previously stipulated to a judgment of noninfringement, /rf. at 1364.
646. M a t 1365.
647. Id.
648. Id.
649. Id.
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exception) did it disavow claim scope, the court concluded that the
term "attached" should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.®^"
The district court also had construed the term "fiexible" to mean
"capable of being noticeably flexed with ease."®^' The Federal Circuit
found that neither the claims nor the specification required this
meaning, noting instead that the specification only requires a semirigid structure.®^^ According to the court, "the degree of rigidity that
amounts to 'semi-rigid,' is part of the infringement analysis, not part
of the claim construction."®^'
In SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Technology Co.,^^'^ defendant Kingston
had successfully argued before the district court that "a" and "an"
should be construed to mean exactly one for certain claim
elements.®^* The Federal Circuit reversed, pointing out:
[T]his court has repeatedly emphasized that an indefinite article
"a" or "an" in patent parlance carries the meaning of "one or
more" in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase
"comprising." That "a" or "an" can mean "one or more" is best
described as a rule, rather than merely as a presumption or even a
convention. The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited: a patentee
must "evince[] a clear intent" to limit "a" or "an" to "one. " The subsequent
use of definite articles "the" or "said" in a claim to refer back to the same
claim term does not change the general plural rale, but simply reinvokes that
non-singular meaning^^^

Here, the claims recited "at least a user data portion and an overhead
portion."^^^ Kingston argued that the specification disclosed only a
single user data portion and a single overhead data portion,®^^ and
the district court reiisoned that subsequent use of "the" and "said" in
reference to "user data portion" and "overhead data portion" "leaves
no doubt that [the claim] covers a method involving only one user
data portion and one overhead portion. "®^^
Both of these arguments are contrary to basic rules of claim
construction and contrary to the factual evidence in the case.®®" First,
"even where a patent describes only a single embodiment, claims will
650. Id. at 1368.
651. /d at 1369.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. 695 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
655. Id. at 1360.
656. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, 512
F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Gir. 2008)).
657. Id. at 1359 (emphasis added).
658. M a t 1360.
659. Id.
660. 5ee¿á. at 1360-61.
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not be 'read restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear
intention to limit the claim scope using words or expressions of
manifest exclusion or restriction.'"^' Here, certain dependent claims
further limited the scope to embodiments that "include only one user
data portion and only one overhead portion."^^ Based on claim
differentiation, there is a strong presumption that the independent
claims should not be limited to a single user data portion and a single
overhead data portion as in the dependent claims.^^^
Furthermore, with a claim, later use of "the" or "said" to refer back
to an earlier term in the claim does not limit that earlier claim term
to the singular.^ For now, patent prosecutors can still rely on "a"
and "an" to mean "one or more."^^
In ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,^^ the Federal Circuit affirmed

the well-known rule that to infringe a method claim, a party must
actually perform all of the method steps.^^' Here, ePlus's brief always
referred "to the capability of the accused system, not an actual act of
infringement," thereby failing to provide any evidence that Lawson's
customers performed the data converting step.^ The court
concluded that "[b]ecause ePlus did not offer any evidence that
showed or even suggested that anybody performed the converting
data step, no reasonable jury could have concluded that claim 28 was
infringed—either direcdy or indirectly."^^®
The Federal Circuit also held that certain claims using means-plusfunction language were indefmite because the specification did not
disclose any structure corresponding to "means for processing."^^''
Although the district court identified three passages allegedly
showing structure for the "means for processing," none provided
actual structure.^^' In particular, stating ¿ a t such a means exists does
not convey structure, nor does a black box labeled "Purchase Orders"
in a
661. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.. Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting LiebeI-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898,
906(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
662. 5aniiùÂ,695F.3datl361.
663. Id.
664. Id. at 1360 (citing Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2008)); see a¿soMPEP § 2173.05 (8th ed. Rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
665. Sandisk, 695 F.3d at 1360.
666. 700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
667. M a t 521.
668. Id.
669. /d. at 522.
670. /d. at 517.
671. /d. at 518.
672. Id.
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ePlus also argued that it was not required to disclose a structure for
the means for processing because implementing that functionality
was already known prior to the patent.^^' The Federal Circuit
clarified that the indefiniteness inquiry looks at the "disclosure of the
patent to determine if one of skill in the art would have understood
that disclosure to encompass [the required structure]."®''' By
attempting to claim "everything that generates purchase orders
under the sun" and not identifying any hardware, source code, or
algorithms, the system claims were indefinite.®'^
Additionally, the ciise provides a warning to litigators about
damages experts.®'® An expert who conveys a lopsided view may be
excluded a& unreliable.®" ePlus had previously entered into five
settlement agreements, which could have been relevant to an
appropriate royalty rate in the current case.®'^ The licensing
arrangements in the various settlements were vastly different,®'^ and
ePlus's expert essentially ignored the three settlements with small
amounts.®®" That was one of the reasons that the district court found
the analytical methods of ePlus's expert to be "flawed and
unreliable."®*' In addition, the licenses were obtained during
litigation, and included lump sums for multiple patents.®®^ Under an
abuse of discretion standard, the Federal Circuit had adequate
evidence to affirm the district court's exclusion of the expert.®®*
In addition to excluding ePlus's only damages expert, the district
court also precluded ePlus from presenting any evidence of damages
at trial.®®* The district court was concerned that last-minute additions
of damages evidence would cause unacceptable delay and expose
Lawson to prejudice.®®^ The Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling as
well, under the same abuse of discretion standard.®®®
673. /d. at 519.
674. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aristocrat Techs. Ausd. Pty. Ltd. v. Int'l
Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328,1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
675. Id.
676. See id. at 522-23 (affirming exclusion of the testimony of a damages expert
when the district court had found the expert's methodology to be "flawed and
unreliable").
677. Mat523.
678. /d. at 522-23.
679. The highest paying agreement was over seventy times larger than the
smallest. Id. at 523.
680. Id.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Id.
684. Id.
685. Id.
686. Id.

894

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:827

In Technology Patents LLG v. T-Mobile (UK) Ltd.,^"^ there were more

than 100 defendants, most of which were foreign cellular carriers.^^
In an unusual move, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
foreign defendants on the merits rather than for lack of personal
jurisdiction.^^
The district court dismissed the case against the foreign carriers for
lack of personal jurisdiction, and granted summary judgment of no
infringement for the defendant domestic cellular carriers.^^^ The
Federal Circuit first affirmed the summary judgment of no
infringement for the domestic carriers based on a thorough review of
the claim language.^^' Recognizing that the same anzdysis of the
merits would demonstrate non-infringement by the foreign
carriers,^^^ the court affirmed the dismissal against the foreign
carriers on that ground, thus avoiding a complex personal
jurisdiction analysis for each of the large number of foreign
The case of MagSil Gorp v. Hitachi Global Storage Technologies,

involved a single patent-in-suit-U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 (the '922
patent). The '922 patent describes technology commonly used in
read-and-write heads of magnetic hard-drives.^^^ Among other things,
read-and-write heads are responsible for reading data, encoded in ¿le
form of magnetic bits, from a magnetic hard drive.^^^ The '922
patent describes one way to do so: by bringing a sensor with two
ferromagnetic layers within close proximity of a magnetic bit. The
magnetic bit causes a change in alignment of the respective
magnetizations of the ferromagnetic layers, which in turns causes a
change in resistance within the sensor.^^' The '922 patent claims
such a device, and in particular claims that reversal of relative
alignment of the magnetization directions "causes a change in the
resistance by at least 10% at room temperature" (claim 1,
representative of the two asserted independent claims) .^^^

687. 700 F.3d 482 (Fed. Cir. 2012), petition for cert,filed,81 U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S.
Apr. 26, 2013) (No. 12-1292).
688. /d. at 489.
689. M at 502-03.
690. /¿.at 489.
691. M at 497-500.
692. Id. at 502-03.
693. /á. at503&n.l.
694. 687 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
695. M at 1378.
696. /d. at 1379.
697. Id.
698. Id.
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At issue in the case was whether the open-ended claim language (in
particular, the claim term "causes a change in the resistance by at
least 10% at room temperature") was enabled by the specification.^^^
The court noted that "[t]he scope of the claims must be less than or
equal to the scope of the enablement to ensure that the public
knowledge is enriched by the patent specification to a degree at least
commensurate with the scope of the claims."™" The court further
noted that MagSil, the plaintiff and the sole-licensee of the '922
patent, advocated for a broad construction the claim term, and had
not "disclaimed the asserted claims' infinite scope in the area of
resistive change."™' The specification, however, stated that a change
in resistance of "as much as 11.8% change was seen."™^ For this
reason, the court held the asserted claims of the '922 patent invalid
for lack of enablement, stating, "the specification must contain
sufficient disclosure to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to make
and use the entire scope of the claimed invention at the time of
filing."™^ In this case, MagSil had failed to show enablement for
much greater changes of resistances (e.g., 100% or 1000%) that
nevertheless fell within the scope of the claimed invention.
B.

Means-Plus-Function Claiming

In Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion 303, Inc.,''°'^ the Federal Circuit

weighed in on the validity of computer-implemented means-plusfunction claims. More specifically, the Federal Circuit held that in order
to meet the claim definiteness requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
paragraph 2, a computer related means-plus-function term requires
disclosure in the specification of either a corresponding structure or
an algorithm.'"^
Ergo accused CareFusion of infringing claims in Ergo's patent
relating to an infusion system for use with a medical patient.'"^ In
construing the claims, the district court held that the terms "control
means" and "programmable control means" are indefinite.™' Ergo's
patent describes an infusion system used to meter and simultaneously

699. W. at 1383.
700. Id. at 1381 (quoting Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed.
Cir. 2008)).
701. Id.
702. Id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
703. /a. at 1381.
704. 673 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
705. W. at 1364-65.
706. M at 1362.
707. M a t 1363.
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deliver fluids from multiple fluid sources into a patient's
Each fluid is individually metered using adjusting means coupled to a
central device. Each different fluid may be discharged at a different
rate.^^^ The terms "control means" and "programmable control
means" are used in connection with the control device.
Ergo argued that general disclosure of a "control device" lends
sufficient deflniteness to the claims because a control device is a
generic structure known to those skilled in the art.^'° Moreover, Ergo
contended that disclosure of an algorithm was not required because a
general purpose computer can perform the function.^'^
The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments, maintaining that
Ergo must disclose more than just a "general purpose computer" that
can be programmed to perform different tasks in different ways.^'^
Means-plus-function terms related to computer implementation must
disclose a corresponding algorithm to properly defme their scope.^'^
The court said that patent claims will be held invalid when the
specification fails to disclose either a structure or an algorithm.^''*
With respect to the claims at issue, the Federal Circuit affirmed that
the means-plus-function claims were indefinite.^'^
Judge Newman issued a strong dissent, noting that thousands of
patented claims have issued in the area of "electronic cyber-assisted
technologies" with similar language.^'^ She further emphasized that
"PTO expertise in such matters as patent examination for statutory
compliance warrants deference."^'' In the end, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in holding that means-plusfunction claims must have a corresponding structure described in the
specification in order to be definite under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
VI. REMEDIES

A. Damages
In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.^^^, the Federal Circuit

addressed several aspects of computing a reasonable royalty. One
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.

/d. at 1362.
Id.
/rf. at 1363.
Id.
Id. at 1364.
Id.
/rf. at 1364-65.
/rf. at 1365.
Id. at 1365-66 {Newman,J., dissenting).
/d. at 1367.
694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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aspect of computing a reasonable royalty is the proper date of the
"hypothetical negotiation."''® Despite the clear rule that "the date of
the hypothetical negotiation is the date that the infringement
began,"™ the district court set the date as August, 2006, the date the
lawsuit was filed.'^' The lower court reasoned that August, 2006 was
the proper date because Quanta was not aware of the patent until
that date, and Quanta was accused of active inducement, which
requires knowledge of the patent.'^^
The Federal Circuit clarified the key difference between when
infringement began versus when Quanta first became liable for
infringement.'^^ In particular, the Federal Circuit identified 2003 as
the hypothetical negotiation date, and reasoned that, "to permit a
later notice date to serve as the hypothetical negotiation date, the
damages analysis would be skewed because, as a legal construct, we
seek to pin down how the prospective infringement might have been
avoided via an out-of-court business solution."'^''
The Federal Circuit also addressed when the "entire market value"
rule applies.'^^ The short answer is not very often. When a patented
feature is part of a larger product, the entire market value rule
applies only when "the demand for the entire product is attributable to
the patented feature."'^^ Here, the LaserDynamics patented feature
relating to optical drives was not shown to drive demand for laptop
computers.'^' The Federal Circuit held that it was not enough to
show that the patented feature was "valuable, important, or even
essential to the use of the laptop computer."'^® Indeed, if that were
sufficient, "a plethora of features of a laptop computer could be
deemed to drive demand for the entire product."'^®
Instead of using the "entire market value," the court applied the
"smallest salable patent-practicing unit" standard.'^" Here, the
patented feature applies to an optical disk drive, and thus the

719. Id. at 75-76.
720. Id. at 75; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116,
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
721. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 75.
722. Id.
725. Id. at 75-76.
724. M a t 76.
725. /¿at66-70.
726. /¿at67-68.
727. / ¿ a t 6 8 .
728. Id.
729. Id.
730. Id. at 67-68; Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285,
287-88 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
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smallest salable patent-practicing unit is an optical disk drive.'^' The
"commodity-type" disk drives provided by Quanta were the proper
royalty base, not laptop computers that include the optical drives.'^^
The Federal Circuit also addressed what types of existing licenses
are most probative for a royalty rate calculation.^^^ First, licenses
entered as part of setdement agreements to terminate litigation are
typically not probative.^^"^ In this case, LaserDynamics focused on one
specific setdement agreement that was entered by a defendant facing
a "severe legal and procedural disadvantage given the numerous
harsh sanctions imposed on it by the district court."'^^ The Federal
Circuit referred to this license as "the least reliable license by a wide
margin."™
A key criterion for identifying reliable license agreements is the
relevance to the patented technology7^^ In particular, actual licenses
to the asserted patent are highly probative because they "reflect the
economic value of the patented technology in the marketplace."'^ In
contrast, licenses with a "vague comparability" are not probative.'^^
Here, the Federal Circuit rejected LaserDynamics' proposal to prove
a royalty rate based on two other DVD-related fpatent licensing
programs, because there was insufficient evidence to show they were
comparable to the asserted patent.^'"' These unrelated patent licenses
were particularly irrelevant because LaserDynamics had multiple
license agreements for the actual patented technology.^**'
B.

Injunctions

Injunctions in patent cases are unique to patent law, so the
procedures for applying a preliminary injunction follow Federal
Circuit precedent. The Federal Circuit applied this in Revision
Military, Inc. v. Balboa Manufacturing Go.'^'*^ In the Federal Circuit, the

likelihood of success is determined by a simple preponderance ofthe
evidence standard, and thus the court rejected the district court's
application of a heightened standard appropriate in the Second
731.
732.
733.
734.
V. Int'l
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.
742.

LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 68-69.
Id.
M at 77-81.
Id. at 77-78; see, e.g. Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889); Deere & Co.
Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 77-78.
Id.
/rf. at 79-80.
/rf. at79.
Id.
M at 80.
Id.
700F.3d524(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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^ However, the weight of the likelihood is a factor in the
ultimate balance of equities.''*'*
C. Invalidity Defense
In Cummins, Inc. v. TAS Distributing Co.,^'*^ the Federal Gircuit

precluded invalidity arguments that could have been made in an
earlier suit for breach of a license agreement.'''®
TAS owned a patent on a certain diesel engine technology, and
Gummins was a licensee.''" Earlier, TAS had sued Gummins for
"failing to make 'all reasonable efforts' to market and sell the TAS
technology.'"''^ Gummins largely prevailed, arguing that it had made
reasonable efforts.'''^
Later, in a new action, Gummins sued for a declaration that the
TAS patent was invalid.'^" Because Gummins could have raised
patent invalidity as a defense or counterclaim in the breach of
contract suit, the Federal Gircuit affirmed the application of res
judicata according to the law of the regional circuit.'^' The Federal
Gircuit noted "Illinois courts have consistently held that the bar of res
judicata extends not only to questions actually decided, but also to all
defenses and counterclaims, which might have been presented in the
prior litigation."'^^
VII. MISCELLANEOUS

A.

Assignment, Inventorship, and Employment Agreements

In Preston v. Marathon Oil Co.,^^^ the court looked at an Intellectual
Property assignment clause and exclusion of an at-will employment
agreement.'^'' After beginning an at-will employment with a
Marathon subsidiary, Preston signed an employment agreement (the
"Agreement") that defined "Intellectual Property" as including
"property made or conceived by EMPLOYEE (or for which
EMPLOYEE files a patent or copyright application) within one year
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.

Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526.
700 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id. at 1333.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
684 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
/d. at 1278.
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after termination of employment with MARATHON."™
The
Agreement stated that "EMPLOYEE agrees to promptly disclose to
MARATHON and does hereby assign to MARATHON all Intellectual
Property, and EMPLOYEE agrees to execute such other documents as
MARATHON may request in order to effectuate such assignment.""^
Under the "Previous Inventions and Writing" section of the
Agreement, Preston wrote simply "CH4 Resonating Manifold," and
the parties dispute whether this writing is sufficient to exclude the
claimed invention from compulsory assignment by Preston to
Mara thon.'^^
The court found, after certifying the question to the Wyoming
Supreme Court, that the continuation of employment is sufficient
consideration to support an intellectual property assignment
agreement.^''^ The court also determined that, because Preston
"made" the invention after his employment and the Agreement
included "property made or conceived" during employment, even if it
had been only conceived before employment, it would be covered
under the Agreement because "there is no dispute that Preston did
not make his invention prior to his employment.""^ The court noted
that Preston's "vague idea" of the "CH4 Resonating Manifold" did not
even rise to the level of conception.^^ Finally, the court decided that
the Agreement served to automatically assign the patent rights
"without the need for any additional act" by operation of law.'^'
B.

Statute of Limitations

In Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Systems Coip.J^^ the district court granted

summary judgment, dismissing Raytheon's claims of trade secret
misappropriation due to a statutory time bar.^^^ The Federal Circuit
never reached the question as to whether California or Texas trade
secret law should apply because it determined "that there is no
meaningful difference between California and Texas law with respect
to the tolling of the statute of limitations."^^ Neither state
automatically puts parties on notice as to potential trade secret claims

755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.

Id. at 1279 (emphasis added).
Id.
M a t 1285.
Id.
Id. at 1286 (emphasis added).
/¿.at 1288.
Id.
688 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
M a t 1312.
M at 1316.
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when employees move to a competitor.™^ Both states' statutes of
limitations start running "when the plaintiff knew or reasonably
should have known of the facts that give rise to the claim," which is a
question of fact.™^ The court concluded that the district court
improperly resolved questions of fact against the non-moving party,
i.e., Raytheon, in its summary judgment decision.™^ The court
concluded that "[i]t was for the jury and not for the district court to
determine when Raytheon should have first discovered the facts
supporting its cause of action."™^
C. Substantial Evidence Revietu
In Norgren Inc. v. International Trade Commission,^^^ the Federal

Circuit accorded high deference to factual findings by the
Commission that led to a holding that asserted claims were invalid.'™
A key claim element was the requirement of a "four-sided, generally
rectangular clamp.""'
The prior art device cited was an "old-style SMC connector,""^
which is shaped generally like a STOP sign (octagonal)."^ The
dissenting opinion demonstrated that the device actually has sixteen
sides."^
Tbe Federal Circuit evaluated the evidence relied on by the
Commission, including: (1) an admission by Norgren's expert that
the only difference between the patent claims and the old-style SMC
connector was the hinge"^ (implicitly admitting that the old-st^le
SMC connector was a four-sided, generally rectangular clamp); (2)
testimony by SMC's'™ expert that the four sides of the old style
connector "are those required for its function and that the shape
formed by those sides is generally rectangular";'" and (3) physical
examination of an old-style SMC connector, from which the
765. M at 1315-16.
766. Id. at 1316 (citing GAL. GIV. GODE § 3426.6 (2012); TEX. GIV. PRAC. & REM.
GODEANN. §16.010(a) (2012)).
767. /d. at 1318-19.
768. /d. at 1318.
769. 699 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Gir. 2012).
770. « . a t 1323.
771. Id. at 1320, 1323. "The dispute centers not on the construction of the claims
but on the factual question of whether the old-style SMG connector . . . is four-sided
and generally rectangular." Id. at 1323.
772. M at 1323.
773. Id.
774. Id. at 1330 (MooreJ., dissenting).
775. Id. at 1324 (majority opinion).
776. SMG was the respondent in the suit brought by Norgren.
777. JVorgren, 699 F.3d at 1324-25.
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Commission concluded that the four outer sides were essential to the
function and were decisive when defining its shape.''^
Concluding that the absence of corners did not detract from the
generally rectangular shape of the old-style SMC connector,^''^ the
Federal Circuit emphasized its deference on factual matters:
The responsibility of this court is not to re-weigh de novo the
evidence on close factual questions; it is to review the decision of
the Commission for substantial evidence. This court concludes
that the Commission's findings are supported by substantial
evidence because "a reasonable mind might accept" that the oldstyle SMC connector is four-sided and generally rectangular.'^'*
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Commission because its finding
that a prior art clamp made the patent obvious was supported by
substantial evidence.
D. Intervening Rights

In the en bane Federal Circuit decision Marine Polymer Technologies,
Inc. V. Hemcon, Inc.J^^ an equally divided Federal Circuit found that
the district court did not err in construing Marine Polymer's patent
term "biocompatible" to mean, inter alia, with "no detectable
biological reactivity as determined by biocompatibility tests."'^^
According to the Federal Circuit, the term "biocompatible" admitted
of no limitation based on the context of the claims, so the district
court properly turned to the teachings of the specification, which
makes clear that "the p-CIcNAc of the invention. . . shows no
detectable biological reactivity as determined by biocompatibility
tests."'«'
HemCon had also argued that it should have intervening rights
because Marine Polymer changed the scope of its asserted patent
claims during a concurrent reexamination.'^** Particularly, HemCon
argued that the scope of the patent claims changed because of
arguments and cancellation of claims made by Marine Polymer
during the reexamination, which allegedly "efFected a substantive
change in the scope of e^ich remaining claim."'^^ The majority opined
that this issue "was a separate and distinct proceeding that is not
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.

/rf. at 1325.
Id.
/d. at 1326.
672 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en bane).
W. at 1359.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
M a t 1360.
Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).
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properly before us on appeal."'®^ Nevertheless, as criticized by the
dissent, the majority went on to discuss this issue at length in dictum
as "an alternative ground for decision.'*'
Particularly, the majority rejected HemCon's intervening rights
argument, stating that 35 U.S.C. § 307(b) is plain and unambiguous
in specifying "that only 'amended or new' claims incorporated into a
patent during reexamination . . . will be susceptible to intervening
rights."'** Additionally, the majority stated that: "[w]hether or not
Marine Polymer's arguments to the examiner and cancellation of
claims during reexamination may have affected the remaining claims'
effective scope, they did not 'amend' these claims for intervening
rights purposes or make them 'new,' which is what the statutory
language requires."'*^ Intervening rights are therefore unavailable
under 35 U.S.C. § 307 (b) as a matter of law.'*"*
E.

Sovereign Immunity

In the en bane Federal Circuit decision 2x)ltek TV,'®' the court found
that its prior decision in Zoltek III was in error and must be
corrected.'®^ In Zoltek III, the Federal Circuit had found that direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) is a necessary predicate for
government habihty under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).'«^ Section 1498(a)
allows for suit against the Government "[w]henever an invention
described in and covered by á patent of the United States is used or
manufactured by or for the United States without hcense of the
owner thereof or lawful right."'^*
The Federal Circuit noted that "[§] 1498(a) makes no reference to
direct infringement as it is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (c),"'^^ and that
so interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a) is contrary to the meaning of its
1910 precursor.'^^ Furthermore, Zoltek ///was erroneous because it:
786. M a t 1362.
787. Id. at 1362-63. The dissent also believed that the issue was properly before
them. Id. at 1371 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).
788. /d. at 1362-63 (majority opinion).
789. M at 1363.
790. Id.
791. 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (reversing the U.S. Court of Federal Claim's
decision in Zoltek III).
792. M at 1314 (en bane).
793. 442 F.3d 1345,1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated en bane, 672 F.3d 1309.
794. 35 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
795. ZoUek IV, 672 F.3d at 1319.
796. Id. As noted by the Supreme Court, the 1910 act was amended for the
purpose of "reliev[ing] the contractor entirely from liability of every kind for the
infringement of patents in manufacturing anything for the Government." Richmond
Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 343 (1928).
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(1) applied dictum, not a holding, from prior case law;^^^ (2)
"render[ed] § 1498(c) superfluous, violating the canon of statutory
construction that 'a statute should be interpreted so as not to render
one part inoperative,'" because 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) required the
infringing activity to occur within the United States, while the same
limitation is found in 28 U.S.C. §1498(c) by eliminating the
Government's liability for "a claim arising in a foreign country;" and
(3) rendered 19 U.S.C. § 1337(1) inefifective.^^«
With regard to 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the provision prevents a patentee
from barring the entry into the United States of products far the United
States that resulted from a patented process, but 19 U.S.C. § 1337(1)
gives such a patentee a remedy of "reasonable and entire
compensation . . . pursuant to the procedures of section 1498 of Title
2g »799 -pj^g court found here that it was clear Congress intended that
patent owners shall have a remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, and that
by requiring 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) liability as a predicate for liability
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), this intent was thwarted.«'^''
Turning to the facts of this case, the court found that government
contractor Lockheed's importation into the U.S. of products made by
the process covered by Zoltek's patent constituted use of the
invention without lawful right under 28 U.S.C. §
Particularly, "the products embody the [process] invention
Also, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) did not exempt the United States from
liability here because both the infringing acts of use and importation
occurred in the United States, not in a foreign country.^°^
CONCLUSION

The Federal Circuit continued to renne certain areas of patent law
in 2012 when the opportunity presented itself. The court will have
even greater challenges in the coming year with the implementation
of the AIA because it will need to establish precedent for a whole new
body of statutory law that shifts the paradigm from a first to invent
strategy to a first to file strategy. While many of these challenges will
not present themselves in the coming year, but rather in several years.
797. See Zoltek IV, 672 F.3d at 1319-20 (discussing NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motíon,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282.1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
798. Id. at 1321 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 131 S. Ct.
1101,1111 (2011)).
799. 19 U.S.C. §1337(/).
800. Zoltek IV, 672 F.3d at 1322.
801. Id. at 1325-26 (panel opinion).
802. M a t 1326.
803. Sei la. at 1326.
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the challenges in 2013 will likely be associated with procedural
elements of the AIA, which are presently open to interpretation and
will be contested by both patent holders and the PTO.
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